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1  Introduction 
 
A wide ensemble of scholars, both in economics and several other disciplines, have 
been studying technological advance, viewed as an evolutionary process. This perspective on 
technological change is closely linked to recent research on industrial dynamics and on 
economic growth as processes intertwined with and driven by technological and 
organizational innovation. In this chapter we lay out the basic premises of this research and 
review and integrate much of what has been learned on the processes of technological 
evolution, their main features and their effects on the evolution of industries.
2 
The proposition that technology advances through an evolutionary process is not a new 
idea. Nearly three hundred years ago, Bernard de Mandeville, pointing to what he regarded as 
one of the most complex and sophisticated artifacts of his era, the (then) modern man-of-war 
[the warship], explained how its design came about this way: 
‘What a Noble as well as Beautiful, what a glorious Machine is a First-Rate Man of War. …We 
often ascribe to the Excellency of Man’s Genius, and the Depth of his Penetration, what is in 
reality owing to the length of Time, and the Experience of any Generations, all of them very little 
differing from one another in natural Parts of Sagacity’ 
Mandeville (1714) vol. II, pp. 141-142
3 
Note also that Adam Smith begins his The Wealth of Nations by highlighting the 
importance of technological advance to economic growth, and discussing the processes 
involved in a way that anticipates modern evolutionary analyses.  In his interpretation of the 
factors behind the enormous improvements in workers productivity - in general, and in his pin 
making example, in particular – Smith proposes that a key driving force has been 
… the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable 
one man to do the work of many’ 
Smith (1981 [1776]) p. 17 
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In turn,  
‘a great part of the machines ‘made use of’ in those manufactures in which labour is most 
subdivided were originally the invention of common workmen, who being each of them employed 
in some very simple operation, naturally turned their thoughts toward finding easier and readier 
methods of performing it.’ Ibid. p. 20;  
In all that, 
‘many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machine … and some 
by that of those who are called philosophers or men of speculation, whose trade it is, not to do 
anything but to observe everything; and who, upon that account are often capable of combining 
together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar object.’ Ibid. p. 21 
 
The processes  through which ‘modern’ warship design came to be and  productivity  
was improved via both ‘learning by doing’ -we would say nowadays- and through the 
development of new machines that Mandeville and Smith are proposing clearly are 
‘evolutionary,’ in the broad sense of the term that we will develop shortly.  
To return to Mandeville’s discussion of the evolution of the design of the modern 
battleship, he does not deny the purpose and competence of those who are designing warships 
at any time. On the other hand, he clearly is denying that the state of the art in this arena at his 
time was the result of great sagacity and creativity on the part of a small number of 
individuals, much less coherent rational planning, and proposing rather that it was the product 
of many minds and many generations of designers, each working somewhat myopically, with 
later generations building on the achievements and learning from the mistakes of earlier ones. 
That is, Mandeville, as most contemporary scholars analyzing technological advance as an 
evolutionary process, departs from any assumption of strong ‘rationality’, in the sense either 
of a fully informed global scan of alternatives made by inventors at any time, or accurate 
forward looking technological expectations. The ubiquitous presence of drivers of behavior 
distinct from strong rationality in the above sense will be indeed a first recurring evolutionary 
theme in the  interpretations of technological and economic change that follow. 
A second  theme well in tune with evolutionary  ideas which will repeatedly appear in 
our discussion is the emphasis on disequilibrium dynamics as a general feature of ‘restless 
capitalism’, as Stan Metcalfe put it. As in the case of Smith’s  ‘practical men’ and 
‘philosophers’  the search for new techniques of production and new products ( as well as 
many other economic behaviors – including investment, pricing, production decisions –) most 
often entail trials and errors, gross mistakes and unexpected successes.  This applies also to 
industrial organization and industrial change: also at this level of analysis, an evolutionary 
perspective focuses upon the processes by which firms persistently search for and adopt new 
technologies as well as new organizational forms and new behavioral patterns as means of 
gaining advantages over their competitors, and upon the feature of the competitive process 
driving the growth, the decline and possible the disappearance of various firms.  
A third theme regards the identification of possible  regularities in the processes of 
technological and industrial change , notwithstanding the lack of an ex ante commitment to an 
equilibrium notion. For example, can we identify some relatively invariant processes of 
innovation? How are innovations selected? What are the relationships between technologies 
and forms of corporate organization? And between technical change and forms of 
competition? How can one characterize the ways through which relatively orderly processes 
of industrial change emerge out of underlying ‘disequilibrium’ behaviors? What is the relative 
role of ‘chance’ and ‘necessity’ in evolutionary processes, and relatedly, to what extent is 
techno-economic evolution path-dependently shaped by events occurring along its historical   3
unfolding? In which ways do institutions and policies embed the processes of technological 
and economic change? 
Come as it may, as Freeman (1982) already noted, since the classics not much progress 
had been made for almost two centuries  in our understanding of the ways new technical 
knowledge is generated  and its impact works through the economy. Karl Marx and Joseph 
Schumpeter stand out as major exceptions, but they were rather lonely voices.
4  The 
importance of technological change reappeared, almost by default, in Robert Solow’s growth 
analysis in the 50’s, but it is only over the last 40 years that one has systematically started 
looking - using  the felicitous expression of Nate Rosenberg - inside the ‘blackbox of 
technology’, investigating  the sources of novel opportunities, the dynamics through which 
they are tapped and the revealed outcomes in terms of advances in production techniques and 
product characteristics. The first part of this chapter maps and tries to integrate such pieces of 
evidence. Explicit recognition of the  evolutionary manners through which technological 
change proceed has also profound implications for the way economists theorize about and 
analyze a number of topics central to the discipline.  
One is the theory of the firm in industries where technological innovation is important. 
Indeed a large literature has grown up on this topic, addressing the nature of the technological 
and organizational capabilities which business firms embody and the ways they evolve over 
time.  
Another domain concerns the nature of competition in such industries, wherein 
innovation and diffusion affect growth and survival probabilities of heterogeneous firms, and, 
relatedly, the determinants of industrial structure. The processes of knowledge accumulation 
and diffusion involve winners and losers, changing distributions of competitive abilities 
across different firms, and, with that, changing industrial structures. Both the sector-specific 
characteristics of technologies and their degrees of maturity over their life cycles influence 
the patterns of industrial organization – including of course size distributions, degrees of 
concentration, relative importance of incumbents and entrants, etc. This is the second set of 
topics which we shall address below. 
Third, the full acknowledgement of technical change as an evolutionary process bears 
distinct implications also for the understanding of the processes of economic growth, fuelled 
as they are by technological and organizational innovation. The ‘physiology’ of modern 
capitalism rests on the evolution of multiple technologies and industries coupled with each 
other via input-output and knowledge flows. Some sectors shrink, others expand, yet other 
new ones appear generally associated with the emergence of radically new technologies. 
Overall, the patterns of growth of modern economies – with both their secular increase in per 
capita productivity and incomes and their fluctuations and discontinuities – are deeply shaped 
by the underlying patterns of technological and organizational evolution.  In the conclusions, 
we shall offer some comments on these points. 
The foregoing domains of analysis define also the structure of this work, which will 
start from some basic notions on the nature of technologies (section 2) and the analysis of 
how technologies evolve (section 3)  together with  a brief discussion of how technologies are 
embedded into business organizations  and of  the implications of all that for the theory of the 
firm ( which is discussed from the angle of strategic management in Teece’s chapter of this 
Handbook) . Next, we will explore the coupled dynamics of technological change and 
industrial evolution (section 4). Finally, in the conclusions, we shall briefly flag some 
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fundamental aspects of  economic growth and development as an innovation driven 
evolutionary process.  
First of all, to set the stage we need to briefly discuss what we mean by ‘technology’. 
 
 
2  On the nature of ‘Technology’ 
 
In the most general terms, a technology can be seen as a human designed means for 
achieving a particular end – being it a way of making steel like the oxygen process, a device 
to process information such as a computer, or the ensemble of operations involved in heart 
surgery. These means most often entail particular pieces of knowledge, procedures and 
artifacts. These different aspects offer different ways of describing technologies. 
 
2.1  Technology and information 
 
What are the characteristics of technological knowledge ? 
It  is useful to take as starting points some very basic features shared by technological 
knowledge  and  information, in general.
5 
First, technology (even when taken to be equal to information) is non-rivalrous in use. 
Use by one economic agent in no way by itself reduces the ability of other economic agents to 
use that technology. 
Second, there is an intrinsic indivisibility in the use of information (half of a statement 
about whatever property of the world or of a technology is not worth half of the full one: most 
likely it is worth zero).  
Third, both technology and sheer information involve high up-front generation cost as 
compared with lower cost in their repeated utilization, when the technology is ‘in place’ (with 
‘being in place’ roughly meaning ‘with practitioners and organizations actually mastering and 
using it’). Moreover, information stricto sensu typically displays negligible cost of 
reproduction, which closely relates (but is not identical) to the proposition that information 
can be used on any scale (greater or equal than one). In fact, there is something genuinely 
special of information in general and also of technical knowledge in that they share a sort of 
notional scale free property. So, in a first approximation (not to be taken too literally: see 
below), an ‘idea’ when fully developed does not imply any intrinsic restriction on the scale of 
its implementation. In a language which we do not particularly like, were there a ‘production 
function’ with information as the only input, it would display on output equal to zero for an 
information below ‘one unit’ and a vertical line for information equal one.
6  
Fourth, as a consequence, there is a fundamental  increasing returns property to the use 
of information and technological knowledge. The use of standard economic goods, ranging 
from shoes to machine tools, implies that use wears them out. This does not apply either to 
information or to technological knowledge. On the contrary, the persistent use of either 
implies at the very least its non-depreciation, at least in technical terms (their economic value 
is a different matter). 
Indeed, important branches of contemporary economic theory are finally beginning to 
take on board the implications of having information as a fundamental input in all economic 
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activities: other chapters in this Handbook address the advances  in the fields such as ‘new 
growth’ and ‘new trade’ theories, informational externalities and standard-setting, 
incorporating some increasing returns implications which the economic use of information 
intrinsically imply.
7 And such exploration is far from over. 
Notice also that even  neglecting the feature of technologies which are different from  
pure ‘information’ (on which more below) , the non-rival use, upfront cost and indivisibility 
characteristics of the latter bear far reaching implications for any theory of economic 
coordination and change. As Kenneth Arrow (1996) emphasizes  
‘[c]ompetitive equilibrium is viable only if production possibilities are convex sets, that is do not 
display increasing returns’, but …’with information constant returns are impossible’ (p. 647). ‘The 
same information [can be] used regardless of the scale of production. Hence there is an extreme 
form of increasing returns’ (p.648) 
Needless to say, a fundamental consequence of this statement is the tall demand of 
providing accounts of economic coordination which do not call upon the properties of 
competitive equilibria. We shall see later the progress done by evolutionary-inspired theories. 
Granted the foregoing properties of technology/information, technological knowledge 
has important characteristics of its own, highlighted by a body of interpretation pioneered in 
the ‘60s and ‘70s by Christopher Freeman in the United Kingdom and a few scholars in the 
United States, which could be called the ‘Stanford-Yale-Sussex (SYS) synthesis’ (cf. Dosi, 
Llerena and Sylos Labini, 2006) based on the locations where at the time most of the major 
contributors were based. In brief, such an interpretation takes on board the basic intuitions on 
the economics of information already present in Arrow (1962a) and Nelson (1959), and 
further refinements (cf. David,1993 and 2004 amongst a few others), together with works 
focusing on the specific features of technological knowledge (including Freeman, 1982, 1994; 
Freeman and Soete, 1997; Nelson, 1981; Nelson and Winter, 1977 and 1982; Pavitt, 1987 and 
1999; Rosenberg, 1976 and 1982; Winter, 1982, 1987, 2005, and 2006a; and Dosi, 1982 and 
1988). In such a synthesis, one fully acknowledges some common features of information and 
knowledge - in general, and with reference to scientific and technological knowledge in 
particular. Together, however, one also distinguishes the specific features of technological 
knowledge and of the ways it is generated and exploited in contemporary economies. 
In the case of technology, it may well be that even if a body of knowledge might be 
notionally utilizable on any scale (say, a production process which can be applied ten or a 
million times), this does not imply that replication or imitation is necessarily easy and cheap 
(see Winter, 2005, 2006a; Winter and Szulanki, 2001, 2002). As we shall see at greater detail 
below, in the case of technological knowledge the ‘scale free reproduction property’ subject 
to three major qualifications.  
Certainly, first, the non-rivalry in use implies non-depletability by reproduction or by 
transfer of both scientific and technological knowledge: of course Pythagoras’ theorem is 
neither depleted by repeated use by Pythagoras himself, nor by learning on the part of his 
disciples. This property however is quite distinct from the easiness and cost of replication of 
knowledge, concerning, say, the fine working of a plant even within the same firm. 
Second, scientific and, even more so, technological knowledge share, to different 
extents, some degrees of tacitness (more on it below). This applies to the pre-existing 
                                                           
7 The properties of information and its distribution – most likely imperfect, incomplete and asymmetric – across 
a multiplicity of economic agents bears also fundamental macroeconomic consequences which cannot be 
explored here: however the interested reader may appreciate the intuitive compatibility between analyses such as 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) and Stiglitz (1994), on the one hand, and the microeconomics of production, 
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knowledge leading to any discovery and also to the knowledge required to interpret and apply 
even codified information after it is generated. As Pavitt puts it with regards to technological 
knowledge, 
‘most technology is specific, complex ... [and] cumulative in its development… It is specific to 
firms where most technological activity is carried out, and it is specific to products and processes, 
since most of the expenditures is not on research, but on development and production engineering, 
after which knowledge is also accumulated through experience in production and use on what has 
come to be known as ‘learning by doing’ and ‘learning by using’’ (Pavitt, 1987, p.9).  
Moreover,  
‘the combination of activities reflects the essentially pragmatic nature of most technological 
knowledge. Although a useful input, theory is rarely sufficiently robust to predict the performance 
of a technological artefact under operating conditions and with a high enough degree of certainty, 
to eliminate costly and time-consuming construction and testing of prototype and pilot plant’ 
(Pavitt, 1987, p.9). 
Notice that given these features of technological knowledge, equating it to a pure 
‘public good’ might be quite misleading. While the characteristic of being non rivalrous in 
use means that there are significant benefits to society as a whole if developed technologies 
were open for all to try to master and employ, even when there are no explicit barriers to use, 
there usually are non trivial costs to acquiring the relevant capabilities (see below on 
technological heterogeneity among firms, bearing far reaching implications also in terms of 
growth and development theories).  
The easiness and cost of replication across diverse economic actors is generally 
positive, often quite significant, and varies a lot too. In fact, as we shall see, the conditions 
and costs for replicability and imitation are important distinguishing marks of different 
technologies. Hence, in the technological domain the ‘scale-freeness’ should not be taken too 
literally: ‘scaling-up’ is by itself a challenging learning activity, often associated with the 
quest for economies of scale (see, below, section 3, on technological trajectories). 
Knowledge differs from sheer information in its modes and costs of replication (see 
Winter and Szulanski, 2001 and 2002; for insightful discussions).  While the metaphor of 
‘reproduction of ideas’ is just pushing a button on the computer with the instruction ‘copy’ 
and possibly ‘send’, the replication of technological knowledge concerning processes, 
organizational arrangements and products, is a painstaking and often quite expensive business 
(see Mansfield et al. ,1981; amongst others).  The bottom line is that even when there is an 
Arrow core, as Winter and Szulanski (2002) put it, in the sense of an informationally 
codifiable template, the actual process of reproduction involves significant efforts, costs and 
degrees of uncertainty about the ultimate success – all linked also with the tacit elements 
involved in technological know-how.  
All this bears important consequences also in terms of the theory of production.
8 The 
divisibility axiom is certainly not on the cards  as a plausible assumption, in that even ‘ideas’ 
- let alone ‘technologies’ - bear the mark of ‘indivisibility’: ‘half an idea’; to repeat, is 
certainly not of half the usefulness of a whole idea. And, together, technologies are ridden 
with indivisibilities of machines, plants, headquarters, etc. Conversely, ‘additivity’ – under 
some important caveats – may stand (much more in the insightful discussion by Winter, 
2008). 
As Winter (1987) suggests, taxonomies based on different degrees of tacitness together 
with other dimensions provide a useful interpretation grid by which to classify different types 
of knowledge. 
                                                           
8 For more details, see Winter (1982), (1987) and (2005); Nelson (1981); Dosi and Grazzi (2006), among others.   7
Tacitness refers to the inability by the actor(s), or even by sophisticated observers, to 
explicitly articulate the sequences of procedures by which ‘things are done’, problems are 
solved, behavioral patterns are formed, etc. (See M. Polanyi, 1967; Nelson and Winter, 1982 
especially chapter 4; Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo, 2005 and the references therein). In a 
nutshell, tacitness is a measure of the degree to which ‘we know more than we can tell’.
9  In 
turn, the different degrees of tacitness of particular bodies of knowledge and the dynamics of 
knowledge codification bear ramified implications in terms of patterns of innovation, division 
of labor and presence/absence of ‘markets for technology’. For example, inter-organizational 
division of labour often requires a good deal of codification of ‘who does what’, and even 
more codification is needed for the existence of a market for technologies, if by that we mean 
a market for pieces of knowledge which can be put to use by someone other than the 
originator of the technology itself, and which can be an object of negotiation and exchange 
(Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2002; Granstrand, 1999; and 
Arora and Gambardella, 2010, in this Handbook). 
More generally, technological activities draw upon specific elements of knowledge, 
partly of the know-how variety and partly of a more theoretical kind. In fact as we shall see 
below, important advances have been made over the last quarter of a century in the 
identification across different technologies of (a) the characteristics of such knowledge –e.g. 
to what extent is it codified and openly available in the relevant professional communities as 
distinct from  the tacit skills of the actors themselves - and (b) its sources - does it come from 
external institutions such as universities and public laboratories, from other industrial actors 
such as suppliers and customers, or is it endogenously accumulated by the people and 
organizations who actually use  it -.
10  
Regarding the sources of technological knowledge, the reconstruction of the diverse 
institutional origins of novel learning opportunities help also in going beyond any first, very 
rough, representation of ‘endogenous’ vs. ‘exogenous’ technical progress.  For the time being, 
let us stick to the basic notion that in no technological activity ‘knowledge drops for the sky’.  
Even in the most science-based sectors a good deal of technological advances are 
endogenously generated by more ‘applied’, task-focused organizations.  Conversely, most if 
not all of the activities which have experienced the highest rates of technological progress, at 
least over the last half century, are also those which have been fuelled by ‘exogenous’ 
scientific advances. 
In order to understand both the nature and the dynamics of technological knowledge , a 
crucial step regards the  understanding of where technological knowledge resides and how it 
is expressed, stored, improved upon (see section 3 below). In that, the account of technology 
in terms of pieces of knowledge , their combinations and their changes has to be 
complemented by a more operational representation of  technology in action.  
 
2.2  Technologies as recipes 
 
                                                           
9 On the possibilities, obstacles and determinants of knowledge codification, in general and with reference to 
contemporary technologies, see Cowan (2001), Cowan, David and Foray (2000), Nelson (2003) and Pavitt 
(1987) and (1999). More specifically on the contemporary patterns of codification of manufacturing 
technologies based on ICT instrumentation and computing, see Becker, Lazaric and Nelson (2005);  Balconi 
(2002), Lazaric and Lorenz (2003) among others. A more specific illustration in the case of the software 
industry is in Grimaldi and Torrisi (2001). 
10 A further discussion, still largely unexplored, regards the codification of learning processes as distinct from 
the codification of search outcomes: cf. the insightful discussion in Prencipe and Tell (2001).   8
The conception, design and production of whatever artifact or the completion of 
whatever service generally involves (often very long) sequences of cognitive and physical 
acts. Hence, it is useful to think of a technology also like a ‘recipe’ entailing a design for a 
final product, whenever there is a final physical artifact – such as in the cookbook case - 
together with a set of procedures for achieving it. The recipe specifies a set of actions that 
need to be taken to achieve the desired outcome, and identifies the inputs that are to be acted 
on, and any required equipment (if some times implicitly). Where a complex physical product 
or artifact is the end of the procedure or a basic element of it, that artifact itself may be 
considered a technology, a view we will consider later in this section. Thus Mandeville’s Man 
of War can be considered as a piece of technology. By the recipe view, so would be the way 
of building that ship. And quite sophisticated technologies, in the sense of the required 
procedures, might be involved also in sailing and using it effectively as a ‘Man of War’. 
The recipe specifies the sequence of procedures that are ‘legal’, at the very least in the 
sense that they are technically feasible and apt to allow the desired outcome. In that respects, 
acts like ‘break the eggs smashing them with the pan over the sink’ are not ‘legal’ in the cake 
making procedures in that they will never yield eventually a cake. As such, (well constructed) 
recipes obey to sorts of grammars which prescribe what can or cannot be done on the ground 
of particular knowledge bases. Recipes are coded programs instructing on the sequential 
combinations of physical and cognitive acts, along the sequence involving various material 
inputs and machine services.
11 
The technologies as recipes view offers an enormous progress in the understanding of 
what technological knowledge is all about as compared to the blackboxing entailed by any 
representation of the kind cake = f (list of ingredients). Among other things, as we shall see 
below, the recipe view offers promising angles also to the formal representation of the 
dynamics of problem-solving procedures involved in any technological activity, However, 
recalling our earlier discussion of technologies as information, it is important to recognize 
that recipe’s have tacit aspects as well as articulated ones, and that the written-down recipe, 
what we will call the codified recipe, may be far from the whole story. Tacit knowledge is 
precisely what is not (or, sometimes cannot even in principle) be conveyed in the codified 
recipe itself, but – in the example of the cake recipe – remains in the head (or better in the 
practice) of grandmothers and French cooks, and is transmitted more by example than by 
instruction. There is a general principle here:  no good artifact or service comes out of 
codified recipes alone. (For a fine discussion see Winter, 2006a.   Or, putting the other way 
round, there is much more knowledge in technological procedures than any codified recipe 
can reveal. 
In some cases, like the literal example of cooking recipes, one single person embodies 
the whole set of skills necessary to lead from the raw inputs to the final output, involving, say, 
how to break the eggs, mix them with flour, put the butter in the pan, etc. all the way to the 
final production of a cake. However, in the domain of industrial technologies this is not 
generally the case: the various pieces of knowledge and skills are distributed across many 
individuals and a crucial issue concerns when and how they are called for. Such a procedural, 
know-how centered, interpretation of technologies brings into sharp view the blurry lines 
between, or, better, the intertwining of technology, division of labor, organization and 
                                                           
11 On the representation of ‘technologies as codes’ cf. C. Baldwin  and Clark (2000).  It also worth mentioning 
the funds-flow theory of production which, while falling short of an explicit procedural representation of 
production activities, attempts to nest the use of inputs into an explicit temporal sequence flagging when the 
inputs themselves are used (i.e., when the flows of their services are called upon.): cf. Georgescu-Roegen (1970) 
and the reappraisal and the applications in Morroni (1992).   9
management: much more below. Thus if one considers the ‘recipe’ for building a Man of 
War, or for sailing it, or for designing it, generally more than one person is involved, and this 
is so regardless of whether complex artifacts are employed as production inputs: no matter 
how mechanized (as it is in contemporary times), the building of a ship is a team operation. 
Different people, and groups, are assigned different parts of the process. In fact technologies 
very rarely are just individual activities of sheer manipulation of physical objects. Rather, 
they involve intrinsic social elements, nested in particular organizations and ensembles of 
them, which have led one of us to suggest the notion of social technologies (Nelson and 
Sampat, 2001), meant to capture the system of norms, beliefs and social practices shaping the 
‘ways of doing things’. In turn, how Mandeville’s ship turns out will depend not only the 
overall ship design and recipe that nominally is being followed, but also on ‘social 
technologies’ governing how the work is divided, the match up of the skills and 
understandings of what is to be done under that division of labor with what actually needs to 
be done, and how effectively the work is coordinated and managed.  
 
2.3  Technologies as routines  
 
The term ‘routines’ has been proposed to recognize and denote the multi-person nature 
of the way organizations ‘make or do things’: see Nelson and Winter (1982); Cohen et al 
(1996); Teece et al (1997); Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000); the special issues of Industrial 
and Corporate Change edited by Augier and March (2000) and by Becker et al (2005); 
Montgomery (1995); Becker and Lazarick (2009); and Foss and Mahnke (2000).  A routine 
that is commanded by an organization is ‘an executable capability for repeated performance 
in some context that has been learned by an organization’ (Cohen et al, 1996, pp.683). 
Routines, as thoroughly argued in Nelson and Winter (1982), (i) embody a good part of the 
memory of the problem-solving  repertoires of any one organization; (ii) entail 
complementary mechanisms of governance for potentially conflicting interests (for more 
detailed discussions see Cohen et al, 1996; and Coriat and Dosi, 1998), and (iii) might well 
involve also some ‘meta-routines’, apt to painstakingly assess and possibly challenge and 
modify ‘lower level’ organizational practices (the more incremental part of R&D activities, 
and recurrent exercises of ‘strategic adjustment’, are good cases to the point). 
Routines involve multiple organizational members who ‘know’ how to appropriately 
elicit an action pattern or a signal in response to the specific environmental circumstances. 
Each individual is constantly engaged
 in receiving signals from other members of the organization
 
or from the environment, responding to the signal with some
 operation from his repertoire, and 
thereby creating a signal
 for other members of the organization, or an effect in the environment.
 
Here, the incoming signal might be the appearance of a partially
 finished automobile on a 
production line, the operation may
 be tightening particular screws and the outgoing ‘signal’ is
 the 
slightly-more-finished automobile going down the line. Or,
 the incoming signal may be a report 
summarizing last month’s
 expense account submissions from the sales force, the operation
 may be 
a comparison with standards and past experience, and
 the outgoing signal a letter of protest. 
(Winter 2006a, p. 134) 
‘Knowing your job’ in  [the] organization is partly a matter
 of having the necessary repertoire of 
actions, and partly knowing
 which actions go with which incoming signals. Each individual
 has 
some ability to perform a considerably larger set of actions
 than are called for in his job, but to the 
extent that ‘practice
 makes perfect’ he will acquire superior skill in the ones actually
 called for. 
(ibid.) 
Note that the ‘program’ built into routines generally involves, at the same time, recipes 
which tend to be silent regarding the division of labour, together with particular divisions of 
labour, plus specific modes of coordination: in the language introduced earlier, the former   10
aspect primarily captures the ‘physical’ technology involved, while the latter entails specific 
‘social technologies’ (Nelson and Sampat, 2001). 
In turn, ensembles of organizational routines are the building blocks of distinct 
organizational competences and capabilities. In the literature, the two terms have often been 
used quite liberally and interchangeably. In the introduction to Dosi, Nelson and Winter 
(2000) and in Dosi, Marengo and Faillo (2008) it is proposed that the notion of capability 
ought to be confined to relatively purposeful ‘high level’ tasks such as, for example, ‘building 
an automobile’ with certain characteristics, while ‘competences,’ for sake of clarity, might be 
confined to the ability to master specific knowledge bases (e.g., ‘mechanical’ or ‘organic 
chemistry’ competences). Clearly, such notion of competences/capabilities largely overlaps 
with what has come to be known as the ‘competence view of the firm.’ (cf. Helfat et al. 2007. 
See also below, and chapter 19). 
 
2.4  Technologies as artifacts 
 
The procedure-centered representation of technology is highly complementary to what 
we could call an artifact-centered account of what technologies are and their dynamic over 
time (see Arthur, 2007; Basalla, 1988; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; and Frenken and Nuvolari, 
2004 among others).  Indeed, recipes often involve designs of what it is there to be achieved 
as a final output. (Although not always: think of services such as airline booking system or a 
surgical operation).  Even when the procedure involves a notion of design, the latter is in 
general only one of the many possible configurations which can be achieved on the grounds 
of any one knowledge base.  In fact, when outputs are physical artifacts, it is useful to study 
their dynamics in the design space (Bradshaw, 1992; and Frenken and Nuvolari, 2004), 
defined by the properties of the components which make up the final output and their 
combinations.  So, in the case of the warship, the technology - seen as a complex product 
system (Prencipe, Davies and Hobday , 2003; and Helfat, 2003) - is made in turn of 
components – the hull, the sailing apparatus, the guns, etc. -, held together by binding 
technical consistency conditions.
12 Further, dynamically, innovation can be fruitfully studied 
in terms of modifications and improvements of the performance characteristics of each 
components and the system as a whole. After all, the numerous discontinuities in naval 
history form the ‘man-of-war’ contemporary to Mandeville to the contemporary USS air 
carrier Ronald Reagan map into the dynamics of both ‘incremental’ change and more radical 
ruptures in the structure and functionalities of  the artifacts: these are precisely two central 
concerns of evolutionary theories of innovation. 
The artifact angle on technologies is in fact useful for a rather general purpose, namely 
the identification of the techno-economic characteristics of specific final products – on the 
one hand, and of  machines, components, intermediate inputs, on the other. Hence, as we shall 
see, the history of technologies can be usefully tracked, from one angle, through the output 
dynamics in their appropriate characteristics space.  This is also the ‘hedonic’ dimension of 
product innovations.  Systematically, technological advances are basically reflected by the 
specific performances of particular pieces of equipment (e.g. how fast can this cutting 
machine cut? What is the tolerance of that  boring machine?  How many bits of information 
can this computer process per second? Etc). 
 
                                                           
12 Visitors of Stockholm can still admire a beautiful 17
th century warship, the Vasa, immaculately conserved 
because it almost immediately sunk, due to the King’s interventions on the design which made it violate 
precisely those conditions.   11
2.5  Knowledge, procedures and input/output relations 
 
Note that in a procedural view of technology, the orienting focus is not immediately the 
list of inputs and equipment used to produce, say, a semiconductor of certain properties, but 
rather it rests in the design of the devices, and the procedures used in the transformation of the 
raw silicon into a microprocessor; not on the quantities of iron, plastic and copper that go into 
an automobile of specified characteristics, but rather on the design of the automobile and the 
procedures used to produce it. Concerning technological advance, modifications and 
refinements of procedures and designs are ‘where the action is’, while changes in 
Input/Output relations are in a way the by-product of successful attempts to achieve effective 
procedures and designs with certain performances and to change them both in desired 
directions. Thus, students of the theory of production should notice that what comes under the 
heading of ‘production functions’ of whatever kind, is basically just the ex-post descriptions 
of what appears in the ‘quantity part’ of the recipe - in the foregoing cooking example, the 
amount of eggs, butter, flour, pans, electricity, human labor, that goes into the production of a 
cake – but such quantities themselves derive quite strictly from the nature of the recipe and 
the characteristics of the final product one is meant to obtain. So, for example, procedures 
involving 90% eggs and 10% flour are not ‘legal’ (they are not part of an admissible 
procedure), because they will yield at most an omelette, and not a cake, irrespectively of 
relative prices. 
Note also that, dynamically, in most cases efforts to change recipes directly entail 
changes in input characteristics and ‘intensities’ and, conversely, attempts to substitute one 
input for another involve changes in production procedures.  Good examples of the former 
are, in economic history, the changes in ‘capital intensity’ associated with the ‘taylorist’ and 
‘fordist’ transformation of business firms - roughly a century ago – as such attempt of major 
proportion to change the ‘ways of doing things’ within organizations.  Symmetrically, 
attempts to ‘substitute more expensive input’ – so easy when seen from the angle of some 
‘production function’ – often require the painstaking search of new recipes and effective 
procedures. 
A question with crucial ramification for any theory of production regards precisely the 
mappings between procedure-centered and input/output centered representations of 
technologies. Suppose one has some metrics in the input/output space, and one is also able to 
develop, some (albeit inevitable fuzzy) metrics in the high dimensional ‘problem-solving 
space’.
13 Granted that, how do the latter map into the former? In particular, were one able to 
put together all the notional recipes known at a certain time apt to yield a cake (or for that 
matter a microprocessor or a car) what would the distribution look like in terms of 
input/output coefficients? In particular, would one find very many recipes which could be 
ordered in such a way as to be approximately described by a homogeneous function (possibly 
a degree one)?  Indeed, there is nothing a priori in the nature of technological knowledge and 
in the nature of recipes and routines which suggests this to be the case (the evidence below 
will just reinforce the point).  In fact, nothing excludes the possibility of recipes, that are quite 
‘near’ in terms of sequences of procedures which they entail, but quite far in the input/output 
space. Vice versa, it is equally possible to have recipes regarding, say, the production of steel, 
chemicals or semiconductors, which might appear at a first look ‘near’ in terms of input 
                                                           
13 As we shell briefly survey below, in the literature formal representations of technologies as recipes are quite 
rare. One of such exception is Auerswald et al (2000). There the ‘distance’ between any two recipes is the 
minimum number of operation that must be changed in order to convert one into the other (p. 397). Such a 
definition is well in tune also with the formalization in Marengo et al. (2000) and Marengo and Dosi (2006).   12
intensities but are in fact quite far away from the point of view of underlying knowledge and 
procedures. 
Issues of the same kind regard the relationship between changes in the recipes and 
routines, on the one hand, and changes in the nature and relative intensities in the use of the 
various inputs, on the other. Do ‘small’ changes in procedures correspond to ‘small’ changes 
in input/output relations? And, vice versa, do major technological revolutions affecting ‘the 
way of doing things’ imply also major changes in the proportions in which different artifacts 
and types of labor enter into the recipes for whatever output?  In fact the existence of possible 
regularities in the dynamic of procedures, artifact characteristics and input intensities will be 
one of the central topics of the next section.  
14 
Another implication is that the foregoing view of technologies focused on the 
procedures involved in, say, designing and manufacturing cars, software, chemical 
compounds, etc, rather than on the (derived) input/output relations allows a straightforward 
account for the ample variance in revealed performances across firms which one observes 
within each industrial sector. Especially if procedures are long, complex and possibly only 
partly understood by the organizations implementing them, one is likely to expect that (a) 
each organization knows only one or very few of them, (b) even for apparently similar 
recipes, any two organizations might master them with very quite different degrees of 
effectiveness. Heterogeneity across firms is, thus, the rule, even in presence of identical 
relative prices: more on all this below. 
 
 
3  How Technologies Evolve 
 
As we suggested above, scholars from a wide variety of disciplines who have studied 
technological advance in some detail have converged on the proposition that technological 
advance needs to be understood as proceeding through an evolutionary process. (Among 
economists and economic historians, the list includes many contributors to the SYS synthesis, 
cited earlier and also Chandler, 1992; Chandler and Galambos, 1970; Mokyr, 1990 and 2002; 
Metcalfe, 1994, 1998, and 2005b; Ziman, 2000).
15  In a broad sense, the process is 
evolutionary meaning at least that at any time there generally are a wide variety of efforts 
going on to advance the technology, which to some extent are in competition with each other, 
as well as with the prevailing practices. The winners and losers in this competition are 
determined to a good extent through some ex-post selection mechanisms. At no instance the 
interpretation of the process gains much by trying to rationalize either in terms of consistent 
‘gambles’ by forward looking players or by efficient ‘market processing’ over ex-ante blind 
ones.  As such, the processes through which technologies evolve are also different in 
important respects from evolutionary processes in biology. In particular, the proposition that 
technology evolves in the above sense in no way denies, or plays down, the role of human 
purpose in the process, or the sometimes extremely powerful body of understanding and 
technique used to guide the efforts of those who seek to advance technology. Thus efforts at 
invention and innovation are by no means totally blind, or strictly random, as often is 
assumed to be the case regarding biological ‘mutation.’ At the same time, as we shall discuss 
                                                           
14 Germane discussions are in Nelson and Winter (1982), Nelson (1981), Auerswald et al. (2000), Winter 
(2006a), and Dosi and Grazzi (2006).A somewhat similar problem in biology is the mapping between genotypic 
and phenotypic structures: cf. Stadler et al (2001).  
15 Quite a few others, without explicitly calling themselves ‘evolutionary’ have expressed largely overlapping 
views, in primis Landes (1969) and (1998), and David (1985) (1989) and (2005), among quite a few others.   13
below, purposefulness of search does not mean at all any accurate matching between forecasts 
and realized outcomes. Hence also the fundamental role of trials, errors and ex-post selection 
among competing variants of artifacts and processes of production. 
Walter Vincenti (1990) has described the kinds of complex knowledge and technique 
that modern aeronautical engineers possess, and discusses in detail how these focus and give 
power to their efforts at design. This body of knowledge and technique enables engineers to 
roughly analyze the likely plusses and minuses of various design alternatives through analytic 
methods or simulations, and thus focus their efforts on particular designs and variants.  A 
portion of the body of understanding that guides problem solving and designing by 
professionals in a technological field comes often from operating experience. At the same 
time, in the contemporary world, many technologies are associated with specific fields of 
applied science or engineering. A good deal of the relevant body of understanding is codified 
in these fields, and serves as the basis for the training of new technologists and applied 
scientists. And these fields also are fields of research. In modern ‘high tech’ industries 
research in the underlying scientific disciplines is an important source of new understandings 
and techniques that become part of the kit used by designers (see Cohen et al. 2002; 
Rosenberg  and Nelson, 1994; and also below).  
Whenever efforts at inventing and designing are oriented in most cases by relatively 
strong professional understanding, part of the relevant variation, and the selection, which is 
involved in the evolution of technologies occurs in the human mind, in thinking and analysis, 
in discussion and argument, in exploration and testing of models, as contrasted with being out 
there in practice. Much of the effort to advance technology proceeds ‘off-line’, as it were. 
Research and development is the term customarily given to such off-line efforts, particularly 
when they involve groups of scientists and engineers working within a formal organization 
who have such work as their principal activity. Technologies and industries vary in regards to 
the amount of funds invested in R&D, and the extent to which R&D is the principal source of 
technological advance, as contrasted with learning by doing and by using. (The intersectoral 
evidence discussed in Dosi, 1988; and Pavitt,1984; broadly applies also nowadays; see also 
below).  However, even in fields where the science base is strong and the lion’s share of 
efforts to advance a technology proceed off line, learning-by-doing and by-using still plays an 
important role (cf. Rosenberg, 1982 ch. 6; and Freeman, 1994).  Pavitt’s foregoing point holds 
throughout past and contemporary technologies: well codified ex ante knowledge, no matter 
how important, does not suffice to establish the detailed properties of any production process 
or artifact. There are three reasons. First, even where the underlying sciences are strong, a 
good part of the know-how that professionals bring to bear in their efforts to advance a 
technology is acquired through operating experience, rather than through formal training in 
the sciences. Second, in any case, as Vincenti argues, efforts at inventing and solving 
technological problems inevitably reach beyond the range of options that are perfectly 
understood. Ultimately what works and what does not, and what works better than what, must 
be learned through actual experience.  Third, as we will highlight later, firms in an industry 
tend to differ from one another in the details of the products and processes they produce and 
employ, in the set of customers and suppliers they know well, and in their past history of 
successes and failures, all of which influences how they focus and undertake search activities.   
Such differences in knowledge and practice hardly come from either science or engineering 
principles, but rather form idiosyncratic experience. 
We have been sketching so far some quite general characteristics of technological 
advance that hold across fields and across countries, often driven by diverse behaviors of 
multiple agents searching and competing with each other. Pushing further, let us ask whether   14
there are some invariances in the knowledge structure and in the ways technological 
knowledge accumulates and, together, what distinguishes different fields and different periods 
of technological advance, if any. 
 
3.1  Technological paradigms and technological trajectories 
 
From the earlier discussion it should be clear that each technology needs to be 
understood as comprising (a) a specific body of practice - in the form of  processes for 
achieving particular ends – together of course with an ensemble of required artifacts on the 
‘input side’; (b) quite often some distinct notion of a design of a desired ‘output’ artifacts; 
and, c) a specific body of understanding, some relatively private, but much of it shared among 
professionals in a field. These elements, together, can be usefully considered as constituent 
parts of a technological paradigm (Dosi, 1982, 1988), somewhat in analogy with Thomas 
Kuhn’s scientific paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). 
16 
A paradigm embodies an outlook, a definition of the relevant problems to be addressed 
and the patterns of enquiry in order to address them. It entails a view of the purported needs 
of the users and the attributes of the products or services they value. It encompasses the 
scientific and technical principles relevant to meeting those tasks, and the specific 
technologies employed. A paradigm entails specific patterns of solution to selected techno-
economic problems – i.e. specific families of recipes and routines– based on highly selected 
principles derived from natural sciences, jointly with specific rules aimed at acquiring related 
new knowledge. Together, the paradigm includes a (generally imperfect) understanding about 
just how and (to some extent) why prevailing practice works.  
An important part of paradigmatic knowledge takes the form of design concepts which 
characterize in general the configuration of the particular artifacts or processes that are 
operative at any time. Shared general design concepts are an important reason why there often 
is strong similarity among the range of particular products manufactured at any time - as the 
large passenger aircraft produced by different aircraft companies, the different television sets 
available at the electronics stores, etc. Indeed, the establishment of a given technological 
paradigm is quite often linked with the emergence of some dominant design (Abernathy and 
Utterback, 1978; Rosenbloom and Cusumano, 1987; Utterback and Suarez, 1993; Suarez and 
Utterback, 1995; Henderson and Clark, 1990; and the critical review of the whole literature in 
Murmann and Frenken, 2006).  A dominant design is defined in the space of artifacts and is 
characterized both by a set of core design concepts embodied in components that correspond 
to the major functions performed by the product and by a product architecture that defines the 
ways in which these components are integrated (Murmann and Frenken, 2006; drawing upon 
Henderson and Clark, 1990).  However, sometimes the establishment of a dominant paradigm 
is not associated with a dominant design.  A revealing case to the point is pharmaceutical 
technologies which do involve specific knowledge basis, specific search heuristics, etc. - i.e. 
the strong mark of paradigms - without however any hint at any dominant design. Molecules, 
even when aimed at the same pathology, might have quite different structures: in that space, 
                                                           
16 Here as well as in Dosi (1982), we use the notion of paradigm in a microtechnological sense: e.g. the 
semiconductor paradigm, the internal combustion engine paradigm, etc. this is distinct from the more ‘macro’ 
notion of ‘techno-economic paradigm’ used by Perez (1985), (2010), and Freeman and Perez (1988) which is a 
constellation of paradigms in our narrow sense: e.g. the electricity techno-economic paradigm, ICTs, etc. The 
latter broader notion overlaps with the idea of ‘general purpose technologies’ from Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 
(1995). (See also the remarks below, section 5). Moreover, the notion of paradigm used here bears a good deal 
of overlapping with that of ‘regimes’ put forward in Nelson and Winter (1977).   15
one is unlikely to find similarities akin those linking even a Volkswagen Beetle 1937 and a 
Ferrari 2000. Still, the notion of ‘paradigm’ holds in terms of underlying features of 
knowledge bases and search processes.
17  Whether the establishment of a dominant paradigm 
entails also the established of a dominant design or not bears a lot of importance in terms of 
dynamics of industry structure along the life cycle of the industries to which a particular 
paradigm is associated. We shall come back to that in section 4.  
Technological paradigms identify the operative constraints on prevailing best practice, 
and the problem solving heuristics deemed promising for pushing back those constraints. 
More generally, they are the cognitive frames shared by technological professionals in a field, 
that orient what they think they can do to advance a technology (Constant, 1980). 
Technological paradigms also encompass normative aspects, like criteria for assessing 
performance, and thus provide ways of judging what is better than what, and goals for the 
improvement of practice.  Each paradigm involves a specific ‘technology of technical 
change’, that is specific heuristics of search. So, for example in some sectors, such as organic 
chemicals these heuristics relate to the ability of coupling basic scientific knowledge with the 
development of molecules that present the required characteristics, while in pharmaceutical 
the additional requirement is the ability to match the molecular knowledge with receptors and 
pathologies. In microelectronics search concerns methods for further miniaturization of 
electrical circuits, the development of the appropriate hardware capable of ‘writing’ 
semiconductor chips at such a required level of miniaturization and advances in the 
programming logic to be built into the chip. The examples are very many: a few ones are 
discussed in Dosi (1988). Here notice in particular that distinct (paradigm-specific) search 
and learning procedures, first, imply as such diverse modes of creating and accessing novel 
technological opportunities, and, second, entail also different organizational forms suited to 
such research procedures.
18  Both properties will turn out to be central when trying to 
characterize distinct ‘regimes’ of technological and industrial evolution (see below).  
Together, the foregoing features of technological paradigms both provide a focus for 
efforts to advance a technology and channel them along distinct technological trajectories, 
with advances (made by many different agents) proceeding over significant periods of time in 
certain relatively invariant directions, in the space of techno-economic characteristics of 
artifacts and production processes. As paradigms embody the identification of the needs and 
technical requirements of the users, trajectories may by understood in terms of the progressive 
refinement and improvement in the supply responses to such potential demand requirements. 
A growing number of examples of technological trajectories include aircrafts, helicopters, 
various kinds of agricultural equipment, automobiles, semiconductors and a few other 
technologies (Gordon and Munson, 1981; Sahal, 1981 and 1985; Dosi, 1984; Grupp, 1992; 
Saviotti and Trickett, 1992; Saviotti, 1996). So, for example, technological advances in 
aircraft technologies have followed two quite distinct trajectories (one civilian and one 
military) characterized by log-linear improvements in the trade offs between horsepower, 
gross takeoff weight, cruise speed, wing load and cruise range (Sahal, 1985; Frenken, Saviotti 
and Trommetter, 1999; Frenken and Leydesdorf, 2000; Giuri, Tomasi and Dosi, 2006; and 
more specifically on aircraft engines Bonaccorsi, Giuri and Pierotti, 2005). Analogously, in 
                                                           
17 A notion quite akin to ‘dominant design’ is that of ‘technological guideposts’ (Sahal 1981, and 1985), a 
guidepost being the basic artifact whose techno-economic characteristics are progressively improved over time. 
18Note also that, there seems to be major differences between science-driven and technology-driven  search  (cf. 
Nightingale, 1998), with heuristics that in one case focus on ‘puzzles further ahead’ – given what one knows – 
while in the technological domain, heuristics typically address ‘how can one solve this problem’, irrespectively 
of the underlying theoretical knowledge.   16
microelectronics, technical advances are accurately represented by an exponential trajectory 
of improvement in the relationship between density of electronic chips, speed of computation 
and cost per bit of information (see Dosi, 1984, but the trajectory has persisted since then). As 
an illustration consider Fig. 1, from Nordhaus (2007) highlighting also the changing 
trajectories associated with paradigm changes, and Fig. 2 pointing out the long-term 
trajectory-like pattern and the ways it has been punctuated by different families of devices.  In 
fact, it is fair to say that trajectory-like patterns of technological advance have been generally 
found so far whenever the analyst bothered to plot over time the fundamental techno-
economic features of discrete artifacts or processes, say from the DC3 to the Airbus 380, 
among aircrafts, or from crucible to Bessemer to basic oxygen reduction among steel making 
processes.  (Admittedly, trajectories in the space of processes and related input intensities 
have been studied much less than trajectories in the output characteristic space, and this is 
indeed a challenging research area ahead). 
 
Insert here Figure 1 and Figure 2 
 
The emergence of relatively ordered trajectories, as already hinted, sometimes is and 
sometimes is not associated with the emergence of dominant designs.  When it does, the 
trajectories appear to be driven by ‘hierarchically nested technological cycles’ entailing both 
relatively invariant core components improving over time and a series of bottlenecks and 
‘technological imbalances’ (Rosenberg, 1976) regarding the consistency among all the 
components of the systems (cf. Murmann and Frenken, 2006). Come as it may, some 
properties of trajectories are important to notice here. 
First, trajectories order and confine but do not at all eliminate the persistent generation 
of variety, in the product- and process-spaces, which innovative search always produces.  The 
paradigm defines proximate boundaries of feasibility and together shapes the heuristics of 
search.  However there continues to be plenty of possible trade-offs between output 
characteristics which different producers explore (Saviotti, 1996) and which will be 
eventually the object of (imperfect and time-consuming) market selection. 
Second, by the same token, trajectories so to speak ‘extrapolated forward’ - in so far as 
their knowledge is shared by the community of firms, practitioners, engineers – are a 
powerful uncertainty reducing representations of what the future is likely to yield in 
technological terms.  However, this remains a far cry from any  unbiased expectation on  the 
time and costs involved in ‘getting there’- wherever ‘there’ means – and, even more so, of the 
probability distributions of individual actors over both technological and economic success.  
That is trajectories are not means to reduce Knightian uncertainty into probabilizable risk.
19 
Indeed, notwithstanding roughly predictable trajectories of advance, both substantive 
uncertainty – concerning future states-of-the-world – and procedural uncertainty – regarding 
yet to come problem-solving procedures – continue to be ubiquitous.
20 
Note that there is no a priori economic reason why one should observe limited clusters 
of technological characteristics at any one time and ordered trajectories over time. On the 
                                                           
19 Such persistent uncertainty is also reflected by systematic forecasting errors concerning costs of innovative 
search, future demand and future profitabilities of new products and processes: see Starbuck and Mezias (1996) 
Beardsley and Mansfield (1978), Freeman and Soete (1997), Dawid (2006) and Gary, Dosi , and Lovallo (2008), 
among others.  Indeed all evidence points in a direction opposite to any assumption of ‘rational technological 
expectations’! 
20 More on the notions of substantive and procedural uncertainty in Dosi and Egidi (1991).  For a discussion of 
the related modeling efforts, cf. Dawid (2006).   17
contrary, as we already argued in Dosi (1988) - given consumers with different preferences 
and equipment users with different technical requirements, and different relative prices over 
different countries, if technologies were perfectly ‘plastic’ and malleable – as standard 
economic representations are implicitly suggesting – one would tend to observe sorts of 
‘isoquants’ in the space of techniques and techno-economic characteristics and products with 
the familiar shape. And, over time, if technological recipes – both in the procedural aspects 
and their input contents – could be freely added, divided, recombined, substituted, etc. one 
would also tend to observe an increasingly disperse variety of technical and performance 
combinations in products, production inputs and available techniques (even if not necessarily 
in their use, given relative prices). The ubiquitous evidence on trajectories, on the contrary, 
suggests that technological advances are circumscribed within a quite limited subset of the 
techno-economic characteristics space. We could say that the paradigmatic, cumulative, 
nature of technological knowledge provides innovation avenues (Sahal, 1985) which channel 
technological evolution, while major discontinuities tend to be associated with changes in 
paradigms. Indeed, here and throughout we shall call ‘normal’ technical progress those 
advances occurring along a given trajectory - irrespectively of how ‘big’ they are and how 
fast they occur- while we reserve the name of ‘radical innovations’ to those innovations 
linked with paradigm changes.   
A change in the paradigm generally implies a change in the trajectories. Together with 
different knowledge bases and different prototypes of artifacts, the techno-economic 
dimensions of innovation also vary. Some characteristics may become easier to achieve, new 
desirable characteristics may emerge, some others may loose importance. Relatedly, the 
engineers’ vision of future technological advances changes, together with a changing 
emphasis on the various tradeoffs that characterize the new artifacts. So, for example, the 
technological trajectory in active electrical components based on thermionic valves had as 
fundamental dimensions heat-loss vacuum-parameters, miniaturization and reliability over 
time. With the appearance of solid state components (the fundamental building block of the 
microelectronic revolution) heat loss became relatively less relevant, while miniaturization 
increased enormously in importance. Similar examples of change in the dimensions of the 
design space can be found in most transitions from one paradigm to another. 
Are there some features which most technological trajectories share?  
A common feature which characterizes trajectories in process technologies and in the 
related equipment-embodied technologies is a powerful trend toward mechanization and/or 
automation of production activities. Recent pieces of evidence are in Klevorick et al. (1995), 
but the phenomenon has been noticed since the classics and plays an important role in the 
analyses of the dynamics of capitalist economies by Adam Smith and Karl Marx. Note that 
such a tendency holds across sectors and across countries characterized by different capital 
intensities and broadly occurs irrespectively of variations in relative prices.
21 Due to its 
generality, in another work (Nelson and Winter, 1977) we called it a ‘natural trajectory’: of 
course there is nothing ‘natural’, strictly speaking, but it is indeed a general reflection of a 
long term trend toward the substitution of inanimate energy to human and animal efforts, and 
more recently also of inanimate information processing to human cognition and control.   
There is another relatively common feature of trajectories of innovation (even if we still 
do not know how common – a task indeed for empirical research ahead), namely learning 
curves. A full chapter in this Handbook is devoted to learning by doing and its different 
formalizations (Thompson, 2010).  Here let us just mention some basic regularities and their 
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bearing on the properties of technological trajectories. It has been found that costs fall 
according to a power law of the kind 
 
β α X p ∗ =  (1) 
 
where  X is the cumulated production, α and β  are two (technology-specific)  constants, and 
p generally stands for unit costs but sometimes represents unit labor inputs or also some 
indicator of product performance. This original statement of the ‘law’ comes from Wright 
(1936)
22 based on aircraft manufacturing (see also Alchian 1963). Similar regularities appear 
in various energy producing technologies, in computers, light bulbs, and many other artifacts 
and processes: for technology-specific evidence and surveys see Conley (1970), Baloff (1971) 
Dutton and Thomas (1984), Gritsevskyi and Nakicenovic (2000), MacDonald and 
Schrattenholzer (2001), Neij (1997), Yelle (1979), Argote and Epple (1990), and Thompson 
(2010) in this Handbook.  Semiconductors offer an archetypical example of a trajectory 
driven by miniaturization efforts yielding the so-called Moore’s law involving the doubling of 
the density of elementary transistor-per-chip and later microprocessors every 2-3 years (cf. 
Fig. 2; more details in Gordon and Munson,1981; Dosi, 1984; Nordhaus, 2007; and Jovanovic 
and Rousseau, 2002).
23  
Interestingly, a steady fall in unit labor inputs seems – at least in some circumstances – 
to appear even when holding the equipment constant. It is the so-called ‘Horndahl effect’, 
named after a Swedish steel mill (Lundberg ,1961), which contributed to inspire Arrow 
(1962b) on learning by doing.
24  Notice that learning effects appear at the levels of industry, 
firms and plants, even if distinct rates and intertemporal variabilities with micro learning 
displaying higher irregularities over time than industry-level rates of progress(for some 
discussion of the evidence see Auerswald et al., 2000). The interpretation of learning 
mechanisms underlying the observed performance trajectories of their differences across 
different paradigms are indeed important tasks ahead for evolutionary analyses of 
innovation.
25  
Together with differences across paradigms in the rates of technological advance, one 
observes major differences in the processes through which such advances occur.  In fact, 
significant progress has been made in the conceptualization of what different technological 
paradigms have in common and how they differ in terms of the sources of knowledge upon 
which they draw – that is the technological opportunities which they tap -, the mechanisms 
through which such opportunities are seized, and the possibilities they entail for innovators to 
extract economic benefit from their technological advances – that is the appropriability 
conditions. 
Let us consider these properties. 
 
                                                           
22 Who, somewhat confusingly, calls ‘performance’ the left hand variable and ‘prevalence’ the right hand one. 
23 Moore’s Law, technically, is formulated in terms of time rather than cumulated output such as in equation (1). 
However, it can be easily reformulated accordingly, noticing that output flows exhibit an exponential growth 
profile over time.  
24 Strictly speaking, the Horndahl effect showed around 2% per year growth in productivity, and thus, again, 
related performance with time and experience rather than accumulated output, but see footnote 21. 
25 For more evidence on the characteristics of specific paradigms and trajectories see also Consoli (2005); 
Chataway, Tait and Wield (2004); Mina, Ramlogan, Tampubolon, and Metcalfe (2007); Possas, Salles-Filho, 
and Da Silveira (1996); Dew (2006), Castaldi, Fontana and Nuvolari (2009) among  many others. 
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3.2  Technological opportunities, the processes of knowledge accumulation, and their 
cumulativeness 
 
Prevailing technological paradigms differ over time and across fields regarding the 
nature of the knowledge underlying the opportunities for technical advances. Relatedly, they 
differ in the extent to which such knowledge has been gained largely through operating 
experience, as contrasted to scientific research.  
While in most fields there is a mix, in the fields generally thought of as ‘high tech’ a 
more significant contribution is nowadays grounded in specialized fields of science or 
engineering.  
Where operating experience and learning by doing and using, are the primary basis for 
professional understanding, as was the case with Mandeville’s example of 18
th century ship 
design, the learning trajectory is going to advance paced by experience with actual new 
designs (and nowadays with the advances incorporated into new vintages of capital 
equipment and ability of using it). In the other hand, understanding can advance rapidly when 
there are fields of science dedicated to that objective. Several recent studies (see e.g. 
Klevorick et al. 1995; Nelson and Wolff, 1997) have shown that the fields of technology that, 
by a variety of measures, have advanced most rapidly are associated with strong fields of 
applied science or engineering. Moreover, firms operating in these fields also tend to have 
higher than average levels of R&D intensity.  In fact, in a secular perspective, the evidence is 
in tune with Mokyr’s general conjecture that the ‘epistemic’ elements of technological 
knowledge – that is those elements associated with an explicitly casual knowledge of natural 
phenomena – have had a crucial (and increasing) importance in modern technological 
advances (Mokyr, 2002 and 2010; Nelson, 2003; Nelson and Wolf, 1997; and Nelson and 
Nelson, 2002). 
Since the Industrial Revolution, the relative contribution of sciences to technology has 
been increasing, and in turn such a science base has been largely the product of publicly 
funded research, while the knowledge produced by that research has been largely open and 
available for potential innovation to use (more in Nelson 2004; David 2001 and 2004; and 
Pavitt, 2001). 
This, however, is not sufficient to corroborate any simple ‘linear model’ from pure to 
applied science, to technological applications.   
First, the point made elsewhere by Rosenberg (1982) Kline and Rosenberg (1986), 
Pavitt (1999), Nelson (1981) continues to apply: scientific principles help a lot but are rarely 
enough.  An enlightening case to the point, indeed in a ‘science-based’ area – medical 
innovation – is discussed in Rosenberg (2009).  Semiconductors technology is another good 
example.  For many decades, efforts to advance products and process technology – crucially 
involving the ability to progressively make circuits smaller and smaller – have taken 
advantage of the understandings in material science and the underlying solid state physics.  
However, much more pragmatic and tacit elements of technological knowhow have 
persistently been crucial. 
Second, it is quite common that scientific advances have been made possible by 
technological ones, especially in the fields of instruments: think of the example of the 
electronic microscope with respect to the scientific advances in life sciences (more in 
Rosenberg, 1982 and 1994). 
Third, it is not unusual that technologies are made to work before one understands why 
they do: the practical (steam) engine was developed some years before science modeled the 
theoretical Carnot engine; even more strikingly, the airplane was empirically proved to work   20
few decades before applied sciences  ‘proved’ that it was theoretically possible!
26  In fact, the 
specificities of the links between technological advances and advances in applied sciences are 
a major discriminating factor among different technological paradigms and different sectors 
(see below on sectoral taxonomies). 
Generally speaking, while it usually holds that technological advance tends to proceed 
rapidly where scientific understanding is strong and slowly where it is weak,  the key has 
often been the ability to design controllable and replicable practices that are broadly effective 
around what is understood scientifically. 
27 (For a more detailed discussion, see Nelson, 
2008a). 
Given whatever potential opportunities for innovation, what are the properties of the 
processes through which they are tapped?  An important feature distinguishing different 
paradigms has to do with the cumulativeness of innovative successes.  Intuitively, the 
property captures the degrees to which ‘success breeds success’, or, in another fashionable 
expression, the measure to which innovative advances are made by dwarfs standing on the 
shoulders of past giants (as such, possibly, the integral of many dwarfs).  Cumulativeness 
captures the incremental nature of technological search, and, crucially, varies a lot across 
different innovative activities (Breschi, Malerba, and Orsenigo, 2000; Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1996; see also below).  More formally, a way to capture cumulativeness is in terms of future 
probabilities of success conditional on past realizations of the stochastic process. In that 
respect, it is a widespread instance of knowledge-based dynamic increasing returns. 
Quite a few technological paradigms embodying knowledge generated to a large extent 
endogenously tend to display dynamics of knowledge accumulation which are more 
cumulative than trajectories of advance which are, so to speak, fuelled ‘from outside’ (e.g. via 
the acquisition of new pieces of equipment generated in other industrial sectors). A further 
distinction concerns the domain at which cumulative learning tends to occur. It is at the level 
of individual firms or is it at the level of the overall community of firms, would-be 
entrepreneurs, technical communities associated with each paradigms, etc.?  In Teece et al. 
(1994), one points at examples such as Intel where cumulativeness applies at both paradigm- 
and firm-level. At the opposite extreme, many instances point at patterns of technological 
change which are anti-cumulative in that they imply competence-destruction at the level of 
individual incumbents (cf. Tushman and Henderson, 1986).  Yet other historical examples 
highlight discontinuities engendered by  firms specific organizational diseconomies of scope 
even under largely cumulative industry-level patterns of accumulation of technological 
knowledge: Bresnahan, Greenstein and Henderson (2008) offer a vivid illustration concerning 
the introduction of the PC and the browser in the case of IBM and Microsoft, respectively. 
 
                                                           
26 In fact, history quite often offers examples of a co-evolutionary kind with the main arrow of causation running 
in one direction or the other depending also on the period and stage of development of knowledge. Take the case 
of the steam engine. While it is true that practical advances in the first half of the 18
th century preceded 
subsequent advancement in classical thermodynamics and the theory of heat engines, it also hold that earlier 
attempt to exploit the power of steam were palpably influenced by the scientific investigations of Torricelli, 
Pascal, Boyle and Hooke on the existence and properties of atmospheric pressure (Kerken, 1961). This may also 
explain why the steam engine was not invented in China, even if all constituent parts (piston, cylinder, etc.) were 
available also there (Needham, 1962-63). [We thank A. Nuvolari for pointing it out to us] 
27 Note that this property does not bear any direct implication in terms newness of the scientific understanding 
itself.  Moreover, high rates of advance often occur when new pieces of knowledge (new paradigms) are applied 
to older, much less science-based technologies.  ICT applications to industrial machinery used in ‘traditional’ 
industries are a good case to the point.   21
3.3  Demand and other socio-economic factors shaping the direction of technological 
advance 
 
The tendency of the advance of a technology to follow a particular trajectory is not an 
indication that user needs and preferences and economic conditions such as relative prices do 
not affect the path of technological development. While the nature of technological 
opportunities does limit the range of directions along which a technology can advance, there 
generally is still significant scope for variation, and, as mentioned above, built into the 
paradigms that guide technological development are also a set of understandings about users’ 
would-be requirements.   
Let us consider in more detail the interplay between knowledge driven venues of search 
and mechanisms of economic inducement. 
A widespread view is that, in fields where the underlying science is strong, efforts to 
advance the technology generally are triggered by new scientific knowledge, and are directed 
to taking advantage of that new knowledge. While there certainly are quite a few 
circumstances where new science has directly stimulated new inventive efforts, several 
studies suggest that usually this is not the case, with the science being applied in industrial 
R&D usually not being particularly new. Conversely, these same studies show that efforts to 
advance practice are very strongly influenced by perceptions of what users value or at least by 
the perception of a problem with clear practical applications (cf. the evidence collected in 
Project Sappho and reported in Freeman, 1982. Similar findings of the importance of 
perceived user needs is reported in Cohen et al, 2002).  At the same time, considerations of 
technological feasibility tend to influence how these perceived demands are addressed. Thus 
an important aspect of the technological regime that shapes progress in a field is the character 
of the user community, their wants and constraints, more generally the (perceived) market  for 
the new products and services that efforts to advance the technology might engender.  
User markets differ greatly both in the nature of the needs and preferences they reflect, 
and in the sophistication of the purchasers. Thus to sell their wares to the airlines, the 
producers of large passenger aircraft know their designs have to meet a long list of quite 
precise requirements, that the airlines have the technical sophistication to assess quite 
accurately. There also are regulatory safety standards that a new aircraft must pass before 
airlines can purchase and use it. Hence, the market for large commercial aircraft is far more 
tuned to technical characteristics of the product, far less moveable by advertising aimed to 
influence tastes, than say the  market for automobiles. The market for operating system 
software mostly consists of the designers and producers of computers for whom various 
technical qualities are important, while the market for software games is mainly individuals 
who are attracted by different sorts of product quality. Indeed, there have been several studies 
that have explored the reasons why certain technological innovations were successful 
commercially while other ones, similar in many technical respects, were not. The principal 
factor often turned out to be understanding of the needs and desires of users by the successful 
innovator. (see the still classic Sappho project, comparing innovative successes and failures 
across otherwise similar firms: cf. Freeman, 1982). 
Granted such broad and widespread interactions between users’ demands and 
technological advances, it holds also that each body of knowledge specific to particular 
technologies, i.e. each paradigm shapes and constrains the notional opportunities of future 
technical advance and also the boundaries of the set of input coefficients which are feasible 
on the grounds of that knowledge base (so that, for example, irrespectively of the relative   22
price of energy, it is difficult to imagine, giver our current knowledge base, a technology for 
the production of hyperpure silicon which would not be very energy-intensive …). 
Within such boundaries, change in the orientation of the new technologies created and 
developed can be induced by changes in demand-side factors in four analytically different 
ways.
28 
First, within a particular paradigm changes in relative prices and demand or supply 
conditions may well affect the orientation of search heuristics. This is what Rosenberg (1976) 
has called focusing devices, and historically documented in a few cases of supply shocks and 
technological bottlenecks (see also the notion of ‘reverse salients’ by Hughes, 1983), from the 
continental blockade during Napoleonic wars to the history of various technical bottlenecks in 
mechanical technologies. The mid 19
th century history of machine tools provides indeed a 
fascinating example. Users always wanted tools that would cut faster, and inventors and 
designers responded. As higher cutting speeds were achieved, this put stress on the metals 
used in the machine blades. New blade materials were invented. And higher speeds also 
increased the temperatures at which blades had to operate; better cooling methods were 
invented and developed. (Bounded rationality and lack of ‘rational’ technological 
expectations stand behind the relevance of these behaviorally-mediated inducements effects. 
But, as already mentioned, evolutionary theories – quite in tune with empirical evidence – are 
at ease with these assumptions.) 
Other powerful and quite general environment inducement factors have to do with 
industrial relations and industrial conflict. As analyzed by Rosenberg (1976), the resistance of 
19
th century English labour, especially skilled labour, to factory discipline and terms of 
employment, has acted as a powerful stimulus to technical change. As Karl Marx vividly put 
it 
‘In England, strikes have regularly given rise to the invention and application of new machines. 
Machines were, it may be said, the weapon employed by the capitalists to equal the result of 
specialized labour. The self-acting mule, the greatest invention of modern industry put out of 
action the spinners who were in revolt. If combinations and strikes had no other effect than of 
making the efforts of mechanical genius react against them , they would still exercise an immense 
influence on the development of the industry’ (Marx, 1847, p. 161; also cited in Rosenberg, 
1976). 
Similarly, industrial conflict has been a powerful driver of the trajectories of 
mechanization of production based on taylorist principles (Coriat and Dosi, 1998). 
Symmetrically, on the demand side, along with obvious feasibility conditions, users’ 
requirements have a major influence on the ensuing trajectories in the products characteristic 
space. As illustrations, think of the role of the requirements of the space and military industry 
on the early (U.S. and world) trajectories in semiconductor devices, or the influence of the 
characteristics of the U.S. market on the trajectories of product innovation in automobile (in 
this case, largely specific to North America). And of course the extreme case of users 
requirements influencing the patterns of innovation is when users themselves are innovators 
(von Hippel, 2005). 
In all these instances, ‘inducement’ stands for the influences that the actual or perceived 
environmental conditions exert upon the problem-solving activities which agents decide to 
undertake.  
The earlier caveat that knowledge bases constrain the directions of search is crucial as 
well, and this applies to both single technologies and broad technological systems (or ‘techno-
economic paradigms’ in the sense of Perez, 1985; and Freeman and Perez, 1988) which 
                                                           
28 For important discussions of ‘inducement effects’, cf. Binswanger and Ruttan (1978), and Ruttan (1997).   23
dominate in the economy over particular phases of development (e.g. steam power, electricity 
and electromechanical technologies, microelectronics and information technologies, etc.). 
Consider for example, Moses Abramovitz’s proposition that  
‘in the nineteenth century, technological progress was heavily biased in a physical capital-using 
direction [and] it could be incorporated into production only by agency of a large expansion in 
physical capital per worker … [while] … in the twentieth century … the bias weakened [and] may 
have disappeared altogether’ (Abramovitz, 1993, p. 224).  
As we read it, it is a proposition on the nature of the knowledge available at a certain 
time in the society and the ways it constrains its economic exploitation, irrespectively of 
relative prices. That is, the proposition concerns the boundaries of the opportunity set 
attainable on the grounds of the available paradigms
29 and the limits to possible ‘inducement 
effects’. 
Second, inducement may also take the form of an influence of market conditions upon 
the relative allocation of search efforts to different technologies or products, that is in the 
allocation of inventive efforts across different paradigms. . Note that while the former 
inducement process concerned the directions of search within a paradigm (e.g. in the inputs 
space or in terms of product characteristics), this second form regards the intensity of search 
and, other things being equal, the rates of advance, between paradigms. In the literature, it has 
come to be known as ‘Schmookler’s hypothesis’(Schmookler, 1966), suggesting that cross-
product differences in the rates of innovation (as measured by patenting) could be explained 
by differences in the relative rates of growth of demand. While it is no a priori reason why 
the perception of demand opportunities should not influence the allocation of technological 
efforts, the general idea of ‘demand-led’ innovation has been criticized at its foundation for its 
theoretical ambiguities. (Does one talk about observed demand? Expected demand? And how 
are these expectations formed? Cf. Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Dosi, 1982; Freeman, 
1982). The empirical evidence is mixed. Schmookler’s empirical research has shown how 
changes over time in the sales of different kinds of products tends to be followed, with a short 
lag, by changes in patenting in the same direction. Thus the rise in the sales of automobiles 
and motorized tractors in the first half of the twentieth century, and the fall off in the use of 
horses for transportation and farm work, was accompanied by a large increase in patenting 
relating to the first two products, and a fall of patenting relating to horse shoes.  However, the 
review in Freeman (1994) concludes that ‘the majority of innovation characterized as 
‘demand led’ … were actually relatively minor innovations along established trajectories’, 
while as shown by Walsh (1984) and Fleck (1988), ‘counter-Schmookler’-type patterns was 
[the] characteristic of the early stage of innovation in synthetic material, drugs, dyestuff, …’ 
and robotics (Freeman, 1984, p. 480). As emphasized by Freeman himself and by Kline and 
Rosenberg (1986), the major step forward here (mentioned already) is the abandonment of 
any ‘linear’ model of innovation (no matter whether driven by demand or technological 
shocks) and the acknowledgement of a co-evolutionary view embodying persistent feedback 
loops between innovation, diffusion and endogenous generation of further opportunities of 
advancement. 
Both mechanisms of ‘inducement’ discussed so far ultimately rest on the ways 
production and market conditions and their change influence ‘cognitive foci’ and incentives, 
and in turn, the way the latter affect behavioral patterns – both in terms of search heuristics 
and allocation rules of those working to created new technology. However changing relative 
                                                           
29 A pale image of all that appear even after blackboxing the whole process into aggregate production functions, 
via different elasticities of substitution and factor saving biases. A pertinent discussion is the cited work by 
Abramovitz (1993). Relatedly see also Nelson (1981).   24
prices can easily ‘induce’ changes in the directions of the technical changes brought to 
practice by users/adopters of new technologies , even holding search behavior  constant, via 
the selection  of the (stochastic) outcomes of search itself. This is the third inducement 
process.  Suppose the allocation of resources dedicated to search were invariant to changing 
relative prices. Even in this case, however, would-be innovations – being they new prediction 
techniques or new machines to be sold to a new firm – will be implemented/selected only if 
they will yield total costs lower than those associated with the incumbent 
techniques/machines. But the outcome of the comparison obviously depends on relative 
prices (a formalization of the process is sketched out below, section 3.8) 
To summarize, one ought to disentangle three sources of ‘inducement’ related to (a) 
changes in microeconomic rules of search, affecting the direction of exploration in the 
notional opportunity space and the pattern of adoption of machine-embodied technical change 
within paradigms; (b) changes in the allocation of resources to search efforts (irrespectively 
of their ‘directions’ across paradigms and lines of business); and (c) market-induced changes 
in the selection criteria by which some techniques or products are compared with alternative 
varieties. An evolutionary interpretation does that in ways that easily allow for endogenous 
interactions (i.e. ‘co-evolution’) between the incentive structure (stemming from relative 
prices and demand patterns), on the one hand, and learning capabilities, on the other. In this 
respect, Gavin Wright (1997) is an excellent illustration of the point. Even in the case of 
mineral resources – i.e. the nearest one can get to a ‘naturally’ determined opportunity set – 
Wright shows that opportunities themselves have been the outcome of both public and private 
search efforts (see also David and Wright (1997)). Conversely, more  conventional views of 
inducement, by making stronger commitments to both optimizing rationality and equilibrium, 
obscure – in our opinion – the distinctions between behavioral effects and system level 
(‘selection’) effects, and, together, render very difficult any account of the sector-specific and 
period-specific patterns of knowledge accumulation. The blackboxing under unobservable 
constructs like ‘elasticities of substitution’ in aggregate or sectoral production functions just 
helps to rationalize the dynamic outcome while obscuring the process driving it. 
Of course, in the longer term major changes in the patterns of innovation are associated 
with the emergence of new technological paradigms. Thus the shift in inventive efforts from 
horse-driven carriages to automobiles and motor tractors can be regarded as the result of 
successful efforts to advance - an ensemble of new technological paradigms - associated with 
the successful development of e.g. gasoline engines, cheaper steel, electromechanical 
machine tools, etc. From this point of view, over such longer timescale it is the emergence 
and development of new technological paradigms that molds the direction as well as the rate 
of technological advance, rather than ‘inducement’ in any strict sense of such a notion. 
 
3.4  Means of appropriation 
 
Most researchers at universities and public laboratories do their work, which on 
occasion may result in a significant technological advance, without expectation of benefiting 
directly from it financially. Some inventors invent because of the challenge of it, and the 
sense of fulfillment that comes with solving a difficult problem. And, more important, as 
already mentioned, in contemporary societies most scientific knowledge – of both the ‘pure’ 
and ‘applied’ nature – has been generated within a regime of open science.  The fundamental 
vision underlying and supporting such a view of publicly supported open science throughout a 
good part of the 20
th century entailed (i) a sociology of the scientists community largely 
relying on self-governance and peer evaluation, (ii) a shared culture of scientists emphasizing   25
the importance of motivational factors other than economic ones and (iii) an ethos of 
disclosure of search results driven by ‘winner takes all’ precedence rules.
30   In Nelson 
(2006), David and Hall (2006) and Dosi, Llerena, Sylos Labini (2006) one discusses the 
dangers coming from the erosion of Open Science institutions.  We cannot get into detail 
here.  We have already mentioned above the importance of (free flowing) advances in pure 
and applied sciences as a fundamental fuel for technological advances – albeit with significant 
variation across technologies, sectors and stages of development of each technological 
paradigm.  However, the major share of inventive activities finalized to economically 
exploitable technologies that goes on in contemporary capitalist societies is done in profit-
seeking organizations with the hope and expectation of being economically rewarded, if that 
work is successful.  In turn, the very existence of a relation between economically expensive 
search efforts by private agents, and (uncertain) economic rewards from successful 
innovations, entails the fundamental incompatibility – originally pointed out by Marx and 
Schumpeter – between any sort of zero-profit general equilibrium and any incentive to 
endogenous innovation (that is, endogenous to the private, ‘capitalist’, sector of the 
economy). 
Granted that, however, two major sets of questions arise. 
First, how profound is such a trade-off, if any, between monopolistic departures from 
competitive (zero profit) conditions and incentives to innovate? 
31  More precisely, what is the 
evidence, if any, on some monotonic relation between (actual and expected) returns from 
innovation, on the one hand, and innovative efforts, on the other? 
Such a monotonic relation is in fact built-in as one of a core assumption within most 
‘neo-Schumpeterian’ models of growth, while the limited ability to appropriate returns to 
invention and innovation often is offered as the reason why the rate of technological progress 
is very slow in some industries. The afore mentioned studies on the nature and sources of 
technological opportunities suggest that this is unlikely to be the primary reason. Rather, it is 
far more likely that the reason for the highly uneven rates of progress among industries lies in 
differences in the strength and richness of technological opportunities.  More generally let us 
suggest that the widespread view that the key to increasing technological progress is in 
strengthening appropriability conditions, mainly through making patents stronger and wider, 
is deeply misconceived. Obviously, inventors and innovators must have a reasonable 
expectation of being able to profit from their work, where it is technologically successful and 
happens to meet market demands. However, in most industries this already is the case. And 
there is no evidence that stronger patents will significantly increase the rate of technological 
progress. (More in Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998; Jaffe, 2000; Granstrand, 1999; Dosi, 
Marengo, and Pasquali, 2006; and the growing literature cited therein).  In fact, in many 
instances the opposite might may well be the case. We have noted that in most fields of 
technology, progress is cumulative, with yesterdays efforts, both the failures and the 
successes, setting the stage for today’s efforts and achievements. If those who do R&D today 
are cut off from being to draw from and build on what was achieved yesterday, progress may 
be hindered significantly. Historical examples, such as those presented in Merges and Nelson 
                                                           
30 On those points following the classic statements in Bush (1945), Polanyi (1962) and Merton (1973), see the 
more recent appraisals in Dasgupta and David (1994); David (2004); Nelson (2004) and the conflicting views 
presented in Geuna et al. (2003) 
31 Note that the possible ‘trade-off’ discussed here is distinct from the purported, and somewhat elusive 
(‘Schumpeterian’), trade-off referred to in the literature between propensity to innovate and market structure: 
more on the theoretical side in Nelson and Winter (1982), and on the empirical evidence Cohen and Levin 
(1989) and Soete (1979), among others.   26
(1994) on the Selden patent around the use of a light gasoline in an internal combustion 
engine to power an automobile or the Wright brothers patent on an efficient stabilizing and 
steering system for flying machines, are good cases to the point, showing how the IPR regime 
probably slowed down considerably the subsequent development of automobiles and aircrafts, 
due to the time and resources consumed by lawsuits against the patents themselves. The 
current debate on property rights in biotechnology suggests similar problems, whereby 
granting very broad claims on patents might have a detrimental effect on the rate of technical 
change, insofar as they preclude the exploration of alternative applications of the patented 
inventions.  
This is particularly the case when inventions concerning fundamental techniques or 
knowledge are concerned, e.g. genes or the Leder and Stewart patent on the achievement of a 
genetically engineered mouse that develops cancer. This is clearly a fundamental research 
tool. To the extent that such techniques and knowledge are critical for further research that 
proceeds cumulatively on the basis of the original invention, the attribution of broad property 
rights might severely hamper further developments. Even more so, if the patent protects not 
only the product the inventors have achieved (the ‘onco-mouse’) but all the class of products 
that could be produced through that principle, i.e. ‘all transgenic non-human mammals’, or all 
the possible uses of a patented invention (say, a gene sequence), even though they are not 
named in the application.  In this respect, Murray et al. (2008) offer a striking illustration of 
how ‘opening up upstream’ (again, in the case of the mouse) – in such an instance, a discrete 
change in the IPR regime in the U.S. – yielded more search / more diverse rates of exploration 
of ‘downstream’ research paths. 
32 
In general, today’s efforts to advance a technology often need to draw from a number of 
earlier discoveries and advances which painstakingly build upon each other.  Under these 
circumstances IPRs are more likely to be a hindrance than an incentive to innovate.  (More in 
Merges and Nelson, 1994; and Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). If past and present components 
of technological systems are patented by different parties, there can be an anti-commons 
problem (the term was coined by Heller and Eisenberg). While in the standard commons 
problem (such as an open pasture) the lack of proprietary rights is argued to lead to over-
utilization and depletion of common goods,  in instances like biotechnology the risk may be 
that excessive fragmentation of IPRs among too many owners which may well slow down 
research activities because each owner can block each other. Further empirical evidence on 
the negative effects of strong patent protection on technological progress is  in Mazzoleni and 
Nelson (1998); and at a more theoretical level, see the insightful discussion in Winter (1993) 
showing how tight appropriability regimes in evolutionary environments might deter 
technical progress (cf. also the formal explorations in Marengo et al., 2009). Conversely, well 
before the contemporary movement of ‘open source’ software, one is able to document cases 
in which groups of competing firms or private investors, possibly because of some awareness 
of the anti-commons problem, have preferred to avoid claiming patents and, on purpose, to 
operate in a weak IPR regime somewhat similar to that of open science, involving the free 
disclosure of inventions to one another: see Allen (1983) and Nuvolari (2004) on blast 
furnaces and the Cornish pumping engine, respectively.  Interestingly these cases of 
‘collective invention’ have been able to yield rapid rates of technical change. Similar 
                                                           
32 It is not possible to discuss here the underlying theoretical debates: let us just mention that they range from 
‘patent races’ equilibrium models (cf. the discussion in Stoneman, 1995) to much  more empirically insightful 
‘markets for technologies’ analyses (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2002), all the way to evolutionary models 
of appropriability (Winter, 1993).   27
phenomena of free revelation of innovation appear also in the communities of users 
innovators: see von Hippel (2005). 
The second set of questions regards the characteristics of the regimes stimulating and 
guiding technological advance in a field of activity, that is how inventors appropriate returns. 
The conventional wisdom long has been that patent protection is the key to being able to 
appropriate them. But this is the case only in some fields of technology. Pharmaceuticals is an 
important example. However, a series of studies (Mansfield et al., 1981; Levin et al., 1985; 
Cohen et al., 2002; among others) has shown that in many industries patents are not the most 
important mechanism enabling inventors to appropriate returns. Thus Levin et al. (1985), find 
that for most industries 
‘lead time and learning curve advantages, combined with complementary marketing efforts, 
appear to be the principal mechanisms of appropriating returns to product innovations’(p. 33). 
Patenting often appears to be a complementary mechanism for appropriating returns to 
product innovation, but not the principal one on most industries. For process innovations 
(used by the innovator itself) secrecy often is important, patents seldom so. These findings 
were largely confirmed by a follow-on study done a decade later by Cohen et al. (2002). 
David Teece (1986) and a rich subsequent literature (cf. the Special Issue of Research Policy, 
2006; taking stock on the advancements since his original insights) have analyzed in some 
detail the differences between inventions for which strong patents can be obtained and 
enforced, and inventions where patents cannot be obtained or are weak, in the firm strategies 
needed for reaping returns to innovation. A basic and rather general finding is that in many 
cases building the organizational capabilities to implement and complement new technology 
enables returns to R&D to be high, even when patents are weak. Thus, despite the fact that 
patents were effective in only a small share of the industries considered in the study by Levin 
et al. (1985), some three-quarters of the industries surveyed reported the existence of at least 
one effective means of protecting process innovation, and more than ninety percent of’ the 
industries reported the same regarding product innovations (Levin et al. 1985).  These results 
have been confirmed by a series of other subsequent studies conducted for other countries 
(see for example the PACE study for the European Union cf. Arundel, van de Paal and Soete 
(1995). 
If there are some bottom lines so far to this broad area of investigation, they are that, 
first, there is no evidence on any monotonic relation between degrees of appropriability and 
propensity to undertake innovative search, above some (minimal) appropriability threshold; 
second, appropriability mechanisms currently in place are well sufficient (in fact, possibly 
overabundant); third the different rates of innovation across sectors and technological 
paradigms can be hardly explained by variations in the effectiveness of appropriability 
mechanisms, and, fourth¸ even less so by differences in the effectiveness if IPR protection. 
 
3.5  Technological Advance and the Theory of the Firm 
 
As mentioned another chapter of this Handbook is devoted to the management of 
innovating firms. Here let us just sketch telegraphically some links between the theory of 
corporate organization and the evolution of technological knowledge and artifacts: related 
discussions are in Nelson and Winter (1982), Winter (1987) and (2006), Dosi, Nelson and 
Winter (2000), Dosi and Marengo (2008), Dosi, Marengo and Faillo (2008), and Helfat et al. 
(2007). 
While in earlier eras much of inventing was done by self-employed individuals, under 
modern capitalism business firms have become a central  locus of efforts to advance   28
technologies.  And firms long have been the economic entities that employ most new 
technologies, produce and market the new products, operate the new production processes.  In 
fact, most modern  firm  operate in  environments that are changing over time in ways that 
cannot be predicted in detail. Technological advances are one of  the primary forces causing 
continuing uncertainty, but other causes  concern  the nature of markets and of competition 
regardless of whether these are associated with technological advance. That is, as already 
discussed above, Knightian uncertainty obtains, both of  the ‘substantive’ and the ‘procedural’ 
kinds.  In these circumstances  there is no way that a truly optimal policy can be even defined 
(among other things the choice set is not well specified), much less achieved.  Rather, firms 
ought to be seen as ‘behavioral entities’, largely characterized by routinezed patters of action, 
modified in the longer term by more explicit ‘strategic’ orientations. In turn, as already 
sketched above, organizational routines and capabilities stemming from ensembles of them 
represent to a large extent the procedural counterpart of what we have discussed so far largely 
in terms of knowledge and its dynamics over time.  In this respect, possibly one of the most 
exciting, far from over, intellectual enterprises over the last two decades has involved the 
interbreeding between the evolutionary research program, largely evolutionary inspired 
technological innovation studies, and an emerging competence/capability-based theory of the 
firm, with complementary roots drawing back to the pioneering organization studies by James 
March, Herbert Simon and colleagues (Simon, 1957; March, 1988; March and Simon, 1958; 
Cyert and March, 1992). Deeply complementary to the analyses of innovative activities 
focused on dynamics of knowledge artefact characteristics and input coefficients, 
organizational analyses have began addressing the behavioural meaning of statements such as 
‘firm X is good at doing Y and Z…’. Relatedly, what are the mechanisms that govern how 
‘organizational knowledge is…’ is acquired, maintained, and sometimes lost?  
Organizational knowledge is in fact a fundamental link between the social pool of 
knowledge, skills, opportunities for discoveries, on the one hand, and the micro efforts, 
directions and economic effectiveness of their actual exploration, on the other. 
Distinctive organizational capabilities  bear their importance also in that they 
persistently shape the destiny of individual firms – in terms of, e.g., profitability, growth, 
probability of survival.  Equally important, their distributions across firms shape the patterns 
of change of broader aggregates such as particular sectors (see section 4 below) and whole 
countries. 
Over time, organizational capabilities  change, partly as a result of deliberate search: the 
ongoing stream of research on dynamic capabilities  (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Helfat 
et al., 2007) addresses precisely the criteria and processes by which capabilities evolve at 
least partly steered by the effort of strategic management. But this fact in no way diminishes 
the significance of the limits on what particular firms are capable of doing at any time, or 
constraints on the range of new things that they can learn to do in a reasonable period of time. 
In fact one often notices the apparent inability of established firms to cope with changes in 
paradigms associated with the development of alternative technologies based on different 
design principles and requiring different skills for their mastery and advancement, and the 
tendency for periods where regimes are changing to be marked by the entry of new firms 
which may come to dominate the industry in coming years. These limits and constraints on 
existing firms, and the consequent openness of an industry to entry under conditions when 
technologies are changing radically are a central aspect of a capability-based   theory and also 
straightforwardly links with the analysis of  the drivers of industrial evolution (more in 
section 4). 
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3.6  The dynamic of productive knowledge, and the dynamics of production coefficients 
 
It is a rather straightforward consequence of the view of technology and innovation and 
of the related knowledge-based theory of the firm, that the latter ought to be expected to 
generally differ in the techniques they master. They are likely to differ in both the broad 
‘recipes’ they use, and even when they use the same nominal recipe (with the same codified 
elements) they almost certainly will differ in the tacit aspects of those recipes. The way work 
on a particular technique is organized and managed almost never is the same across firms in 
the same nominal industry. Firms command and use different routines. Some important 
consequences this theoretical orientation which are quite at odds with traditional thinking in 
economics are the following.. 
a)  In general, there is at any point in time one or very few best practice techniques which 
dominate the others irrespectively of relative prices. 
b)  Different firms are likely to be characterized by persistently diverse (better and worse) 
techniques. 
c)  Over time the observed aggregate dynamics of technical coefficients in each particular 
activity is the joint outcome of the process of imitation/diffusion of existing best-
practice techniques, of the search for new ones, of the death of some others and of the 
changing shares of the incumbent ones over the total (these processes of course might or 
might not correspond to a similar dynamics in terms of firms which are so to speak the 
carriers of these techniques :see below) 
d)  Changes over time of the best practice techniques themselves are likely to display rather 
regular paths (i.e. trajectories) in the space of input coefficients . 
Let us further illustrate the previous points with a graphical example. 
Suppose that, for the sake of simplicity, we are considering here the production of an 
homogeneous good under constant returns to scale with two variable inputs only, x1 and x2 .
33 
A paradigm-based theory of production predicts that, in general, in the space of unit 
inputs, micro coefficients are distributed somewhat as depicted in Figure 3. Suppose that at 
time t the coefficients are c1 ..... cn; where 1 . . . . . n are the various techniques labelled in 
order of decreasing efficiency at time t. It is straightforward, for example, that technique c1 is 
unequivocally superior to the other ones no matter what relative prices are: it can produce the 
same unit output with less inputs of both x1  and x2. The same applies to the comparison 
between c3 and cn, etc. 
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
A rapidly expanding evidence robustly supports the existence of wide and persistent 
inter-firm and inter-plant asymmetries in production coefficients at all levels of 
disaggregation (cf. Nelson, 1981, Baily et al., 1992, Baldwin, 1995, Bartelsman and Doms, 
2000, Bottazzi et al, 2007; Jensen and McGuckin, 1997, Power, 1998, Rumelt, 1991, 
Syverson, 2004; and Dosi, 2007). 
Typically the support of inter-firm / inter-plant distribution of both labour productivities 
and ‘total factor productivity’
34 are strikingly wide even at relatively high levels of sectoral 
disaggregation.  So, for example, Syverson (2004) finds that at a four digit disaggregation, 
‘the average 90-10 and 35-5 percentile [labour] productivity rations within industries are over 
                                                           
33  Note that fixed inputs, vintage effects and economies of scale would just strengthen the argument. 
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4 to 1 and 7 to 1 respectively’ (p. 535). Similar inter-firm dispersion at 3-digit disaggregation 
are found in the Italian industry by Bottazzi et al (2007) and Dosi (2007). Moreover, such 
productivity differentials are quite stable over time with some mild regression-to-the-mean 
tendency (cf. Dosi, 2007).  A similar picture emerges from all micro longitudinal data banks 
we are aware of.  It is also important to notice that inter-firm / inter-plant differences in labour 
productivities are not accounted for by differences in relative factor intensities (cf. Syverson, 
2004; preliminary elaborations by one of us on the Italian industry show that the within-
industry / cross-firm correlations between labour productivities and output/capital ratios are 
basically nil). Interestingly, such widespread differences in production efficiency across firms 
and across plants continue to apply irrespectively of the degrees of sectoral disaggregation of 
the  data. As Griliches and Mairesse (1997)  put it 
‘we … thought that one could reduce heterogeneity by going down from general mixtures as ‘total 
manufacturing’ to something more coherent, such as ‘petroleum refining’ or ‘the manufacture of 
cement’.  But something like Mandelbrot’s fractal phenomenon seem to be at work here also: the 
observed variability-heterogeneity does not really decline as we cut our data finer and finer.  
There is a sense in which different bakeries are just as much different form each others as the steel 
industry is from the machinery industry.’ 
For evolutionary perspective, heterogeneity in the degrees of innovativeness and 
production efficiencies should not come as a surprise.  A non-negligible part of the 
differences in production efficiencies must be due to different distributions of capital 
equipment of different vintages (the early intuition about the phenomenon is from Salter, 
1962)  However, broader differences are what one ought to expect to be the outcome of 
idiosyncratic capabilities (or lack of them), mistaken-ridden learning and path-dependent 
adaptation. Indeed, such an evidence is quite in tune with the view of technological evolution 
presented above: this is in fact what one ought to expect to be the outcome of idiosyncratic 
capabilities (or lack of them), mistaken-ridden learning and path-dependent adaptation. 
Let us call this property technological dominance, and call some measure of the 
distribution of the coefficients across heterogeneous firms as the degree of asymmetry of that 
industry (for example, the standard deviation around the mean value C).  
The first question is why doesn’t the firm using the n-th  adopt technique cl? The  
simplest answer based on the foregoing  argument  is ‘because it does not know how to do 
it...’. That is, even if it is informed about the existence of c1, it might not have the capabilities 
of developing or using it. Remarkably, this might have little to do with the possibility for c1 to 
be legally covered by a patent. The argument is much more general: precisely because 
technological knowledge is partly tacit, also embodied in complex organizational practices, 
etc., technological lags and lead may well be persistent even without legal appropriation. The 
opposite also holds: if the two firms have similar technological capabilities, imitation might 
occur relatively quickly, patent protection notwithstanding, by means of ‘inventing around’ a 
patent, reverse engineering, etc.. 
We are prepared to push the argument further and suggest that even if all firms  were 
given  the codified part of the recipe for technique c1 (or, in a more general case, also all the 
pieces of capital equipment associated with it), performances and thus revealed input 
coefficients might still widely differ. It is easy to illustrate this by means of the foregoing 
cooking example: despite readily available cooking recipes, one obtains systematically 
asymmetric outcomes in terms of widely shared standards of food quality. Note that this has 
little to do even in the domain of cooking with ‘variety of preferences’: indeed, we are ready 
to bet that most eaters randomly extracted from the world population would systematically 
rank samples of English cooks to be ‘worse’ than French, Chinese, Italian, Indian .... ones,   31
even when performing on identical recipes!!. If one accepts the metaphor, this should apply, 
much more so, to circumstances whereby performances result from highly complex and 
opaque organizational routines (Incidentally, Leibenstein’s X-efficiency rest also upon this 
widespread phenomenon). 
Suppose now that at some subsequent time t’ we observe the changed distribution of 
microcoefficients c’3,..., c’m,.  How do we interpret such a change? 
The paradigm-based story would roughly be the following. At time t, all below-best-
practice firms try with varying success to imitate technological leader(s).  Moreover, firms 
change their market shares, some may die and other may enter: all this obviously changes the 
weights (i.e. the relative frequencies) by which techniques appear. Finally, at least some of 
the firms try to discover new techniques, prompted by the perception of innovative 
opportunities, irrespectively of whether relative prices change or not (for the sake of 
illustration, in Figure 3, the firm which mastered the technique labelled 3 succeeds in 
leapfrogging and becomes the technological leader while m is now the marginal technique). 
As discussed at greater length in Cimoli and Dosi (1995), and in several contributions to 
Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz (2009), this interpretation of the distributions of techniques of 
production bears fundamental implications also in terms of international growth patterns.  
Consider again the illustration of Fig. 3 and suppose that the evidence does not refer to two 
distributions of technical micro coefficients over time within the same country, but instead to 
two countries at the same time: after all, paraphrasing Robert Lucas, we only need informed 
tourists to recognize that most countries can be ranked in terms of unequivocal average 
technological gaps. The explanation of such international differences fundamentally rest upon 
the processes of accumulation of technological capabilities.  Indeed, the economic discipline 
has undertaken far too few exercises at the highest available disaggregation on international 
comparisons among micro technical coefficients. Our conjecture is that less developed 
countries may well show higher utilization of all or most inputs per unit of output and perhaps 
even higher relative intensity of those inputs that conventionally would be consider more 
scarce (that is, some loose equivalent of what euphemistically the economic profession calls 
in international trade the Leontieff paradox). An evolutionary interpretation is 
straightforward: unequivocal technological gaps account for generalized differences in input 
efficiencies. Moreover, if technical progress happens to involve also high rates of saving in 
physical capital and skilled-labour inputs, one may also observe less developed countries 
which do not only use more labour per unit of output but also more capital per unit of labour 
input as compared to technological leaders (Figure 3 illustrates a similar case: compare for 
example, techniques c3 and cn).
35 
 
3.7  Technological regimes: sectoral specificities in patterns of technological advance, and 
the characteristics of innovative actors 
 
An important area of investigation has concerned over the last couple of decades the 
identification of different patterns of industrial evolution conditional on specific regimes of 
technological learning.  By ‘regimes’ here we mean distinct ensembles of technological 
paradigms with their specific learning modes and equally specific sources of technological 
knowledge. One of the aims of the well-known taxonomy by Keith Pavitt (1984) is precisely 
                                                           
35 The models in Nelson, 1968, and Nelson and Pack, 1999, are congenial formalizations  of  productivity 
differences across nations that have these features. Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990) and Cimoli and Soete (…) 
present also formalizations  of international trade flows driven by technology gaps across countries   32
to capture such relations mapping ‘industry types’ and industry dynamics (see also Marsili, 
2001, for important refinements).  To recall, Pavitt taxonomy comprises four groups of 
sectors, namely 
(i)  ‘supplier dominated’, sectors whose innovative opportunities mostly come through the 
acquisition of new pieces of machinery and new intermediate inputs (textile, clothing, 
metal products belong to this category); 
(ii)  ‘specialized suppliers’, including producers of industrial machinery and equipment; 
(iii)  ‘scale intensive’ sectors, wherein the sheer scale of production influence the ability to 
exploit innovative opportunities partly endogenously generated and partly stemming 
form science based inputs .
36 
(iv)  ‘science based’ industries, whose innovative opportunities co-evolve, especially in the 
early stage of their life with advances in pure and applied sciences (microelectronics, 
informatics, drugs and bioengineering are good examples). 
Other, rather complementary, taxonomic exercises have focused primarily on some 
characteristics of the innovation process, distinguishing between a ‘Schumpeter Mark I’ and a 
‘Schumpeter Mark II’ regime, dramatizing the difference between the views of innovative 
activities from Schumpeter (1911) and Schumpeter (1942): see Dosi et al. (1995), Breschi and 
Orsenigo (2000), Malerba and Orsenigo (1997), Marsili (2001). The Mark I regime is 
characterized by innovations carried to a good extent by innovative entrants and by relatively 
low degrees of cumulativeness of knowledge accumulation, at least at the level of individual 
firms.  Conversely under the Mark II regime innovative activities are much more cumulative 
and undertaken to a greater extent by a few incumbents which turn out to be ‘serial 
innovators’. 
In our view, such taxonomic exercises are important in their own right in that they 
identify discretely different modes through which innovation occurs in contemporary 
economies.  And they are also important because they allow a link between such modes of 
innovative learning, the underlying sources of knowledge, the major actors responsible for the 
innovative efforts and the ensuing  forms of industrial organization.  See Table 1 from Pavitt 
(1984) for one of such empirical attempts. 
Different technological regimes are supported by distinct institutions governing public 
research and training and, at the market end, the interactions among producers.  Such 
institutions, together with the corporate actors involved contribute to define distinct sectoral 
systems of innovation and production: see Malerba (2002 and 2004). 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
3.8    Formal models of search and technological evolution 
 
The dichotomy between knowledge-ridden recipes and routines, on the one hand, and 
more ‘blackboxed’ input/output representations is also reflected by two quite different styles 
of modeling, still in search for systematic links with each other. 
The newer, and less developed, procedure-centered modeling genre builds on the notion 
that a technology is made of a discrete set of operations or components (Auerswald et al., 
2000; Levinthal, 1997; Dosi, Levinthal and Marengo, 2003; and Marengo and Dosi, 2006).  
Whatever name is chosen they stand for physical or cognitive acts eventually leading to the 
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white goods and other consumer durables vs. ‘continuous’ flow industries such as oil refining or steel making.    33
solution of whatever ‘problem’, being it e.g. the construction of an automobile or the design 
of a piece of software. Different notional sequences of operations on components are 
associated with different degrees of efficiency in the solution of such problems (or no solution 
at all). One way of synthetically capturing these formalizations, represented over a relatively 
simple topology, is by nesting them over a fitness landscape. The notion was originally 
developed in biology as a way of mapping configurations of possibly interrelated traits into 
their fitness values (see Kauffman and Levin, 1987; and Kauffman, 1993). Within this 
modeling style central questions regard the characteristics and efficacy of different ways of 
‘decomposing’ the overall problem, the implications of different search/adaptation strategies 
(e.g. whether involving ‘local’ vs. ‘global’ exploration), and the conditions under which 
‘lock-in’ into suboptimal outcomes occurs. 
A domain of analysis to which such a modeling enterprise seem to straightforwardly 
apply is the theory of organization and its boundaries, and this is in fact where most of the 
attention has gone so far (more in Marengo and Dosi, 2006; see the discussion in Dawid, 
2006, with reference to a large ensembrle of agent-based –ACE- models).  However, to 
repeat, not much effort has gone so far into the mapping between the recipe dynamics and the 
input/output dynamics
37.  In a rare exception, Auerswald et al. (2000) assume that the labor 
requirement associated with each ‘operation’ is a random variable (so that the labor 
requirement of each recipe is a random field).Indeed, a quite challenging modeling frontier 
regards the explicit representation of evolving problem-solving procedures, constrained by 
paradigm-shaped ‘grammars’ ad their ensuing dynamics in the more familiar space of 
input/output coefficients.   
As things stand now, even in the evolutionary camp, formal representations of 
technologies tend to ‘blackbox’ the procedural part.  As a result, most of the representations 
of techniques are in terms of quantities of inputs per units of output, with the output itself 
being often assumed homogeneous or sometimes defined by specific performance 
characteristics. Hence, the innovative dynamics is characterized by the evolution of the input 
vector (and, possibly, the output characteristics vector) over time.  At this level of analysis, 
important modeling questions regard the form, and the support of the probability distribution 
of ‘innovative draws’ agents may access, whether access is conditioned upon expensive 
investment (‘R&D’) and whether innovations are embodied or not in particular pieces of 
equipment. One feature however is common to most evolutionary representations of 
techniques in that they assume at any given time that firms are characterized by fixed 
coefficients of production (in the jargon they are endowed with Leontief techniques).  In our 
view this is a quite natural representation of the (degenerate) ‘production possibility set’ firms 
are able to access in the short-term: in fact agents essentially know how to master the recipe 
actually in use while it is quite far fetched to postulate that they have, so to speak, cupboards 
full of notional recipes which they could instantaneously adopt were relative prices different. 
Rather, any attempt to change technique has to be considered as a time-consuming, innovative 
effort, most often subject to uncertain outcomes. 
Well supported by the microeconomic evidence discussed above, the basic unit of 
analysis of many evolutionary models are heterogeneous techniques which at any point in 
time coexist and compete with each other, and evolve over time according to some 
search/learning process. Straightforwardly, each technique can be pictured as a vector x (.,.) (t) 
                                                           
37 To our knowledge the only attempt to link also at a formal level a dynamic in the space of recipes yielding 
learning-curve type trajectories in the space input efficiencies is Auerswald et al (2000). (See also Muth, 1986, 
albeit for a much more ‘blackboxed’ perspective)   34
specifying, in the simplest case, the quantities of inputs per unit of homogeneous output.  
Each technique may or may not be labeled also in terms of agents which embody and hence 
master them. As reviewed in Silverberg and Verspagen (2005), a family of models sticks to 
the ‘technique-as-the-primitive’ representation (cf. Silverberg and Lehnert, 1993 and 1994; 
Colinsk, 1989).  The postulated ‘search’ under this assumption is blackboxed within some 
random arrival process, drawing from a time-drifting normal distribution (Colinsk, 1989) or 
either time invariant or drifting Poisson distributions (Silverberg and Lehnert 1993 and 1994).  
Think for simplicity of a one-dimensional process, whereby one draws, say, in the space of 
labor productivities. The process for sound empirical reasons is assumed to be multiplicative 
on the techniques already in use (as witnessed for example by the observed dynamics in labor 
productivities: cf. Dosi, 2007). 
In another style of modeling, the technique is also tagged to specific firms, trying to 
capture the idiosyncratic features of innovative (and imitative) search. A model to that effect 
is presented in Iwai (1984a) and (1984b), where the distribution of techniques is taken to 
correspond to a distribution of firms which both innovate and imitate each other (with 
probabilities that are a function of the frequencies of the particular firms/techniques in the 
industry). 
In quite a few modeling exercises, in tune with Nelson and Winter (1982), firm-level 
search is represented as a two stages stochastic process.  In the first stage firms draw from a 
Bernoulli process the event ‘access to innovation’ (or to imitation), with a probability 
dependent on the amount of resources invested in search.  A successful draw yield to access 
to a second stochastic process determining the actual ‘innovation’ (or imitation) defined by 
the input coefficients of a new technique (which in fact might turn out to be inferior to the 
incumbent one, and in that case the firm sticks to the latter). 
The whole family of a process whereby advances are likely to occur in the 
neighborhood of the techniques already in use within any one firm is also a straightforward 
representation of the cumulativeness and locality of technological advances.
38 
It follows also from the foregoing discussion that the ways opportunities are tapped and 
degrees of success in doing so depend to a good extent upon the capabilities and past 
achievements of economic agents. So, more technically, think of ‘opportunities’ as some 
measure on the set of input coefficients which are reachable at time t, with positive 
probability, conditional on the vector x j (t) of coefficients that agent j (j = 1,…,n) masters at 
that time. And, straightforwardly, the transition probabilities can be seen as capturing both 
paradigm-specific opportunities and capabilities, specific to each j for any given search 
effort.
39 Differing opportunities can be straightforwardly captured by different width of the 
support of the probability distribution of possible draws, as well as by the shape of the 
distribution itself.
40   
                                                           
38 Related formalizations of ‘local’ technical learning are in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1963) and Antonelli (1995). 
39 This is to make things simple: in more complicated but more realistic accounts, allowing for imitation, 
transition probabilities of each j should depend also on the states achieved by all other agents and some metrics 
on their distances: see for example Chiaromonte and Dosi (1993), Dosi et al. (1994), Fagiolo and Dosi (2003). 
40 For example, in Dosi, Fagiolo and Roventini (2006), one assumes a Beta distribution which, depending on the 
parameterization, may attribute the major mass to ‘bad draws’ (in the case of scarce opportunities) and vice 
versa. The opportunities actually tapped depend crucially also on the agents’ ability to explore and explicit them: 
in Nelson (1982) we sketch a model with a two stages stochastic process (‘study and test’ and next 
‘design/blueprint drawing’) wherein agents’ knowledge influences the ‘quality’ of the choice set of new 
techniques – in terms of expected cost for achieving an advance of a given magnitude or expected magnitude of 
advances for a given R&D investment.   35
It is also relatively easy to formalize the ‘inducement mechanisms’ discussed in section 
3.3.  Effects on the direction of search formally imply that market shocks induce different 
partitions of the notional search space attainable at t, and focus search in those regions where 
one is more likely to find, say, savings on the inputs which are perceived as scarce and more 
expensive. Note that, for example, part of the (highly convincing) interpretation of 
inducements to mechanization in the American nineteenth century economy suggested by 
Paul David (1975) can be rephrased in this way.
41 
As already mentioned, relative prices may induce changes in the revealed directions of 
technological change even when the micro directions of search remain invariant. 
Let us illustrate it by recalling the very basics of the Markov model of factor 
substitution from Nelson and Winter (1982, pp. 175-92). 
It has been mentioned earlier that ‘innovative opportunities’, when talking about 
process innovations, can be represented as the (bounded) set of states in the space of inputs 
(per unit of output) attainable starting from an arbitrary technique in use at time t. Suppose 
that search is a random process invariant in t (this implies that one excludes both decreasing 
returns to innovative efforts and those inducement effects upon search rules, discussed 
earlier). As already sketched in subsection 3.7, when a new technique is drawn, it is compared 
with the one currently in use, given the prevailing input prices, and the minimum cost one is 
obviously chosen. The sequence of factor ratios displayed by a firm can be described by a 
Markov process characterized by the transition probability matrix F =[ ik f ], where  ik f is the 
probability that state i follows state k.
42  Note that the transition matrix is time invariant but 
actual transition probabilities depend on relative input prices. This is because of the 
‘comparison check’: holding constant the initial technique and the one drawn, whether the 
latter will be adopted or not might depend on relative prices,
43 and that choice will set 
different initial conditions for the next draw, etc.. The intuition on dynamic-choice-of 
technique inducement suggests that if the relative price of some input increases, the transition 
probabilities, loosely speaking of ‘getting away’ from the techniques which intensively use 
that input will also increase. And in fact, Nelson and Winter (1982, pp. 180-192) establish the 
result, in a two-input case, that, with the appropriate ordering in terms of relative input 
intensities, the transition matrix 
^
F (based on the new relative prices) stochastically dominates 
the ‘old’ one, F. It is an appealing result, resting so far on many formal qualifications, but 
certainly worth further exploration.
44 The bottom line is the following. Even if opportunities 
do not change and agents do not change their search rules, it is enough that relative prices 
enter into the criteria of choice between what has been found by search and what is already in 
                                                           
41 without any analytical loss, except the dubious commitments to rational choice with reference to a mysterious 
‘Innovation Possibility Frontier’ 
42 Nelson and Winter (1982), quite in tune with the general idea that there are ‘paradigm-based’ constraints to 
the scope of factor substitution, assume that factor ratios can take only N possible values; thus i,k = 1,…, N. 
43 It obviously does not whenever the newly discovered technique is more efficient in terms of every input – a 
case which evolutionary interpretations easily allow. 
44 Among other points, the clarity of representation in terms of a time-invariant finite-state Markov process has 
its inevitable downside in that, - taking seriously the question of ‘what happens as time goes to infinity?’ – all 
persistent states return infinitely often in the limit (see also below on path-dependency). However, it should not 
be formally impossible to make transition probabilities phase-space dependent, thus giving also more persistence 
to the weight of past ‘inducements’. However, more down to the earth, does the fact that in the mathematical 
limit, say, Honduras will interchange with Sweden an infinite number of times weakens the (indeed, formally, 
transient-bound) proposition that both Sweden and Honduras are likely to display path-dependent technical 
coefficients over any reasonable, finite window of observation?   36
use, in order to determine – in probability – ‘induced’ changes in the patterns of factor use, at 
the level of individual firms and whole industries.
45 
Evolutionary formalizations search, innovation and imitation abhor any assumption of 
‘rational technological expectations’, and thus deny the possibility, in the actual world and in 
theory, of deriving the amount of resources devoted to search from unbiased expectations 
about probabilities of innovation/imitation the future returns from them.  Rather, the 
somewhat extreme opposite assumption is generally made: propensity to invest in R&D are 
time-invariant behavioral routines possibly changed only if performances fell below a certain 
‘satisfying’ threshold (with few exceptions: see Silverberg and Verspagen, 1996, for a model 
with adaptive variations of such propensities to invest in search,; Kwasnicki and Kwasnicka, 
1992; and Yildizoglu, 2002 for a model wherein R&D rules evolve stochastically by means of 
a Genetic Algorithm based search). 
Clearly firm-specific dynamics of innovation nurture a persistent heterogeneity across 
firms in terms of production efficiencies (and, too rarely in the models but most often in 
reality, product characteristics) curbed only to a partial extent by the processes of imitation.  
In turn, as we shall discuss in Section 4, such inter-firm differences underlie different 
competitive abilities and contribution to shape the evolution of industrial structures. 
 
3.9  Invention, innovation, and diffusion  
 
Innovation diffusion is the subject of the chapter of this Handbook by Stoneman and 
Battisti (2010), and we refer to it for a more detailed survey of the evidence.
46  However, as 
that chapter is explicitly confined to equilibrium analyses of such an evidence, let us offer 
some basic elements of distinct interpretations more in tune with the evolutionary view 
outlined so far. 
One of the contributions of J. Schumpeter’s work that is often cited with reference to 
technological change concerns his distinction between invention, innovation, and diffusion.  
According to his definition, invention concerns the original development of some novel 
would-be process of production or product while innovation entails its actual introduction and 
tentative economic exploitation.  Diffusion describes its introduction by buyers or 
competitors.  It is a rough and ‘heroic’ conceptual distinction, which can hardly be found in 
practice, since the empirical processes are usually never precisely like this.  The invention  is 
often introduced from the start as an innovation by economically-minded research 
establishments.  Diffusion entails further innovation on the part of both developers and users.  
All three activities are often associated with changes in the characteristics of, and incentives 
for, potential innovators/adopters.  However, Schumpeter’s distinction between invention, 
innovation, and diffusion is still a useful theoretical point of departure.  For example, 
invention is suggestive of the sort of unexploited potential for technological progress whose 
sources we discussed above, while innovation and diffusion hint at the economically 
                                                           
45 We do not dare extend this conjecture to whole economies, since not much has been done toward the 
exploration of multi-sectoral systems, linked by input-output relations, checking also the empirical plausibility 
of phenomena like re-switching of techniques etc. – which appeared prominently in the theoretical debates in the 
1970s and disappeared by magic later on.  A few evolutionary formalizations are multisectoral, including 
Verspagen (1993) and some include also an admittedly rudimentary input/output structure such as Chiaromonte 
and Dosi (1993), Fagiolo and Dosi (1998) and Dosi, Fagiolo, Roventini (2008), but, to our knowledge none has 
addressed the dynamics of technique in a multi-sector ‘general disequilibrium’ framework. 
46 See also Hall (2005) and Geroski (2000), and the older discussion from an evolutionary angle in Metcalfe 
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motivated efforts aimed at the incorporation of technological advances into economically 
exploitable products and processes.   
The two major stylized facts already highlighted by Rosenberg (1976) are, first that 
diffusion is a time-consuming process, and, second that the speed varies widely across 
technologies and across countries.  One should add two further properties, namely that, third¸ 
diffusion of successful innovations most often follows S-shaped, but asymmetric, profiles 
(Figure 4 illustrates all three points).  However, fourth, a good percentage of innovations, 
even when introduced by a small number of initial adopters, never diffuses and thus 
ultimately fail (hence also the sample selection bias stemming from considering only 
successful ones). 
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
There are few basic ingredients which evolutionary analyses (of both the empirical and 
the theoretical kinds) share in the interpretation of diffusion dynamics.  An obvious building 
block is the acknowledgement of the ubiquitous heterogeneity across would-be adopters on 
nearly every dimension which might think of as influencing adoption - ranging from sheer 
size all the way to different ‘absorptive capacities’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and abilities 
to use the new techniques, pieces of equipment and even consumption goods.  Indeed, if one 
adds to adopters’ heterogeneity also some dynamics in the characteristics of the good to be 
diffused, one goes a long way in accounting for the observed retardation factors in innovation 
diffusion (cf. David, 1990).  The copious empirical literature estimating probit models of 
diffusion is well in tune.   
On the supply side, heterogeneity is amply endogenous to the dynamics of learning, 
innovation, imitation, selection amongst producers (see the next section): products 
characteristics and their prices change and with that also the markets shares and the very 
identity of producers themselves.
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On the demand side, especially when the artifact to be diffused is a production good, 
learning-by-using is a powerful driver of diffusion.  And, indeed, in evolutionary worlds, the 
ability to learn how to use and exploit new technologies is likely to be subject to unexpected 
bonanzas ad well as dire delusions (the model in Silverberg et al., 1988, highlights the point; 
discussions of the related ‘cognitive biases’ are in Dosi and Lovallo, 1997; and Gary et al., 
2008).  Conversely, the frequent requirements of organizational changes associated with the 
adoption of innovations, especially when the latter are producer goods, represent a powerful 
retardation factor, both with respect to adoption as such and to the reaping of its economic 
benefits (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000, powerfully illustrate the point). 
The process involves important collective dimensions as well, including knowledge 
spillovers, network externalities, endogenous evolution of preferences as well as sheer herd 
behaviors. 
How does one formally represent such dynamics? In a nutshell, full-fledged 
evolutionary  models of innovation, imitation, selection basically entail diffusion dynamics as 
a corollary of the whole process (Silverberg et al., 1988, is an early example).  Interestingly, 
evolutionary models are capable of generating the major ‘stylized facts’ of diffusion 
dynamics recalled earlier as emergent properties of the evolutionary process whereby the 
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improvements in the initiated artifact and in the techniques to produce it: an illustration of the point in the case 
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system collectively ‘self-organize’ around the use of a new technology.  However, an 
interesting family of ‘reduced form’ models compresses the inter-firm competition dynamics 
while offering a succinct account of diffusion nested into heterogeneous  populations, and 
driven by dynamic increasing returns, network effects and endogenous preferences.  A 
powerful and versatile formal instrument are generalized Polya urns (cf. Arthur et al., 1987; 
Dosi and Kaniovski, 1994; Bassanini and Dosi, 2001 and 2006).  The approach is discussed at 
length in the chapter by Arthur (2010), this volume.  Let us just recall here that such formal 
machinery is well apt to account for (a) the influences of stochastic events along the 
evolutionary dynamics upon the long-term outcomes (and thus the related path-dependency of 
technology selection); (b) the widespread importance of dynamics increasing returns 
(possibly intertwined with forms of decreasing returns within ‘badly behaved’ dynamics: cf. 
Dosi and Kaniovski, 1994); and (c) the possibility that technological evolution ‘gets it wrong’ 
(in the sense that convergence to the dominance of a technology which is ‘inferior’ to other 
ones available in some form from the start which however the collective dynamics of 
adoption did not reinforce: see below). 
Can one identify different families of evolutionary processes of diffusion?  An attempt 
to do so is in Nelson, Peterhansl and Sampat (2004) where one distinguishes four ‘archetypes’ 
of diffusion patterns conditional on the presence/absence of dynamics increasing returns and 
of sharp persuasive feedbacks on the returns to adoption itself.  Phenomena like fads belong 
to one extreme (absence on both dimensions), while QWERTY-type diffusion (David, 1985) 
belongs to the opposite one. 
 
3.10  The path dependence of the processes of technological evolution 
 
Two quite general features of the processes of technological innovation discussed so far 
are dynamic increasing return, path dependency and their interaction. Since other chapters of 
this Handbook are devoted to this two topics, we need not address the details of such 
phenomena. However, again, let us flag their role in technological evolution. (We shall come 
back to some of the issues below when addressing industrial evolution). 
Let us consider the relationship between evolutionary success, intrinsic ‘fitness’, and 
chance (i.e. unpredictable historical events) in the development and diffusion of innovations. 
Students of technical advance long have noted that, in the early stages of a technology 
history, there usually are a number of competing variants or even competing paradigms. This 
was the case of vehicles, some driven by the combustion engines, some by steam engines, 
some by batteries. As we know, gasoline-fuelled engines came to dominate and the other two 
possibilities were mostly abandoned. The standard interpretation for this is that gasoline 
engines were potentially superior and with time, trial-and-error and learning such superiority 
became manifest. There is however an alternative explanation grounded in the interaction 
between dynamic increasing returns of some kind, network externalities and path-dependency 
(cf. David, 1985; 1988; 2001b;and Arthur, 1988 and 1989). In this second interpretation the 
internal combustion engine need not have been innately superior. All that would have been 
required was that, because of a run of luck, it became heavily used or bought, and this started 
a rolling snowball mechanism fuelled by some sort of collective positive feedback. 
What might be behind an increasing returns rolling snowball? Arthur, David, and other 
authors suggest several different possibilities. One of them is that the competing technologies 
involved are strongly cumulative technologies. In a cumulative technology, today’s technical 
advances draw from and improve upon the technology that was available at the start of the 
period, and tomorrow’s in turn build on today’s. So, in the case of the history of automobile   39
engine technology - according to the cumulative technology interpretation - gasoline engines, 
steam engines, and electrical engines, all were plausible alternative technologies for powering 
cars, and it was not clear which of these means would turn out to be superior. Reflecting this 
uncertainty, different inventors tended to make different technological bets.  Assume, 
however, that simply as a matter of chance (or marginal choice or political decision), a large 
share of these efforts just happened to focus on one of the variants – e.g. the internal 
combustion engine – and as a result, over this period there was much more overall 
improvement in the design of internal combustion engines than in the design of the two 
alternative power sources. Or, alternatively, assume that while the distribution of inventive 
efforts were relatively even across the three potential paradigms simply as a matter of chance 
significantly greater advances were made on internal combustion engines that on the other 
ones. But then, at the end of the first period, if there were a rough tie before, gasoline 
powered engines now are better that steam or electric engines. Cars embodying internal 
combustion engines will sell better. More inventors thinking about where to allocate their 
efforts now will be deterred from allocating their attention to steam or electric engines 
because large advances in these need to be achieved before they would become competitive 
even with existing internal combustion engines. Thus, there are many strong incentives for the 
allocation of inventive efforts to be shifted toward the variant of the technology that has been 
advancing most rapidly. The process is cumulative. The consequences of increased 
investment in advancing internal combustion engines, and diminished investment in 
advancing the other two power forms, are likely to be that the former pulls even further 
ahead. Relatively shortly, a clear dominant paradigm has emerged. And all the efforts to 
advance technology further in this broad area come to be concentrated on improving that 
particular paradigm. 
There are two other largely complementary dynamic increasing returns stories. One 
stresses network externalities or other advantages to consumers or users if what different 
individuals buy are similar, or compatible, which lends advantage to a variant that just 
happened to attract a number of customers already. The other stresses systems aspects where 
a particular product has a specialized complementary product or service, whose development 
lends that variant  special advantages. Telephone and computer networks, in which each user 
is strongly interested in having other users have compatible products, are commonly 
employed examples of the first case. Video cassette recorders which run cassettes that need to 
be specially tailored to their particular design, or computers that require compatible programs, 
are often used examples of the second. Paul David’s story (1985) of the reasons why the 
seemingly inefficient ‘QWERTY’ typewriter keyboard arrangement has persisted so long as a 
standard involves both its familiarity to experienced typists and the existence of typewriter 
training programs that teach QWERTY. As in the QWERTY story, the factors leading to 
increasing returns often are intertwined, and also linked with the processes involved in the 
development of cumulative technologies. Thus, to return to our automobile example, people 
who learned to drive in their parents’ or friends’ car powered by an internal combustion 
engine naturally were attracted to gas powered cars when they themselves came to purchase 
one, since they knew how they worked. At the same time the ascendancy of automobiles 
powered by gasoline burning engines made it profitable for petroleum companies to locate 
gasoline stations at convenient places along highways. It also made it profitable for them to 
search for more sources of petroleum, and to develop technologies that reduced gasoline 
production costs. In turn, this increased the attractiveness of gasoline powered cars to car 
drivers and buyers.   40
Note that, for those who consider gas engine automobiles, large petroleum companies, 
and the dependence of a large share of the nation’s transportation on petroleum, a complex 
that spells trouble, the story spun out above indicated that ‘it did not have to be this way’. If 
the toss of the die early in the history of automobiles had come out another way, we might 
today have had steam or electric cars. A similar argument recently has been made about the 
victory of A.C. over D.C. as the ‘system’ for carrying electricity (David (1992)). The story 
also invites consideration of possibly biased professional judgments and social or political 
factors as major elements in the shaping of long run economic trends. After all, in these 
stories all it takes may be just a little push. 
It is difficult to precisely assess the importance and frequency of such path-dependent 
processes, since of course counterfactuals involving ‘running the tape of history another time’ 
is impossible (in social sciences but also in biology). Come as it may, evolutionary 
interpretations of technological change – and as we shall see of industrial dynamics and 
development – are deeply skeptical of any view of evolution as the inevitable unfolding of a 
process leading from the good to the better. Such a view tries to justify and explain any end-
state of the system as being the best possible outcome given the (perceived) constraints by 
imperfectly informed but fully ‘rational’ agents along the whole path. The view, emphatically 
illustrated in Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) basically aims at rationalizing whatever one 
observes as an equilibrium and, at the same time, at attributing rational purposefulness to all 
actions which led to any present state. 
On all that, David (2001b) and Dosi (1997) coincide in the rejection of any Panglossian 
interpretations of history as ‘the best which could have happened’, mainly ‘proved’ by the 
argument that ‘rational agents’ would not have allowed anything short of the optima to 
happen (compare the amazing similarities with dr. Pangloss’ remarks in Voltaire’s Candide 
on the virtues of Divine Providence). 
 
 
4  Schumpeterian Competition and Industrial Dynamics  
 
The evidence discussed in the previous section highlights both the general 
characteristics that technological knowledge possesses and at the same time the widespread 
diversity in the mode and efficacy by which individual firms access and exploit such 
knowledge even when undertaking very similar activities and operating in the same line of 
business. 
Idiosyncratic capabilities and, dynamically, idiosyncratic patterns of learning by 
individual firms are the general rule.  In turn, such persistently heterogeneous  firms are 
nested in competitive environments which shape their individual economic fate and 
collectively the evolution of the forms of industrial organization.  In the following, we shall 
first offer an overview of some broad features of such competitive environments.  Next, we 
shall consider at greater detail a few properties of the processes of industrial evolution, trying 
to distinguish those elements which are common to all industries and others which are 
regime-specific.  Finally, we shall discuss the modeling efforts which try to interpret the 
patterns of industrial evolution. 
Differences in products, and in processes of production – and as a consequence costs 
and prices – are central features of the competitive process in which firms are involved in 
different ways. Let us call Schumpeterian competition the process through which 
heterogeneous firms compete on the basis of the products and services they offer and get   41
selected with  some firms growing, some declining, some going out of business, some new 
ones always entering on the belief that they can be successful in this competition. Such 
processes of competition and selection are continuously fuelled by the activities of 
innovation, adaptation, imitation by incumbent firms and by entrants. While the former 
process involves selection across firms, the latter entails learning and selection among 
techniques, organizational practices and product attributes within the firms themselves. 
In any case, user selection of particular technological variants over others, together with 
firms’ selection in financial markets, are central drivers of competition, industrial 
demographics and changing industry structures. It is important to consider both users and 
suppliers. It is reasonable to start from the observation that the production and adoption of 
‘superior’ consumption goods, capital goods and intermediate inputs often underlies the 
competitive advantage of particular firms.  And, indeed, a major analytical question bears on 
the precise drivers and mechanisms of the competition process. Another one regards how long 
‘competitive advantages’, of whatever kind, last. In industries where a company which 
introduces a very attractive innovation is able to prevent rapid imitation by competitors, and 
also is able to expand its own market share rapidly, the result may be a highly concentrated 
industry. This certainly has been the result in some well know cases, for example IBM’s long 
domination of the mainframe computer industry, and Intel’s continuing domination of the 
market for microprocessors. However, in many other instances successful innovators have not 
been able to develop and hold on to a dominant market position, in the face of continuing 
efforts at innovation by their competitors.  Joseph Schumpeter employed the term ‘creative 
destruction’ to refer both to the nature of technological advance, and to what often happens to 
leading firms in industries where technological advance is rapid and incumbents are unable to 
seize novel opportunities.  In fact, significant changes in industrial structure as a result of 
innovation are more likely when the success of a particular new product or process is 
associated with the ascendancy of new technological paradigms. Successful innovations in 
these cases are associated with a different design concepts, or different ways of doing things, 
than what it replaced. Continued viability of firms in this area of activity then may require 
learning to work effectively with the (partly) new knowledge bases and new organizational 
routines. In such a context, an industry structure that had been stable for a considerable period 
of time may be ripe for the success of new entrants.  
If we step back from the details of particular industry patterns, there are a few general 
properties that stand out from industry studies. First, as Schumpeter, and Marx before him,  
argued long ago, competition in industries where innovation is central has little to do with the 
idea that such process generates results that are economically ‘efficient’ in the standard static 
sense of that concept in economics. What is driving the process is the striving by some firms 
to get an economic advantage over their competitors. As discussed in section 3 above, both 
the cross section and the time profiles of modern industrial sectors inevitably show 
considerable variation across firms in measures of economic efficiency and in profitability: in 
short, industries are characterized by considerable and persistent ‘inefficiency’ in the standard 
allocative sense of that term.  Second, in industries marked by continuing innovation, 
competitive conditions may be fragile. This applies particularly to the cases whereby firms 
who have been successful innovators are able to hold off imitation or other effective 
competitive responses, and their profitability enables them to stretch their advantage further.  
Third, this notwithstanding, while the evolutionary notion of ‘competition’ differs from 
competition of the economic textbooks in fundamental respects, it does serve a related 
function. To the extent competition is preserved, a significant share of the benefits of 
technological progress go to the customers/users of the technology. And on the supply side,   42
over industrial evolution, competition tends to roughly keep prices moving in line with costs 
(including R&D costs). 
This is the bird eye interpretation of innovation-driven competition and the ensuing 
industrial evolution.  How well does it hold against the evidence? Are there some finer 
regularities in such processes?  What are the distinct characteristics of firms and their 
distribution which systematically persist over time, if any?  How do such characteristics 
within the population of competing firms affect their relative evolutionary success? And, 
moreover, amongst the foregoing properties and relation between them which ones are 
invariant across industries, and, conversely, which ones depend on the technological and 
market characteristics of particular sectors? 
Let us begin with the evidence concerning some features of the dynamics in (i) 
industrial structures and firms characteristics, broadly understood to cover variables such as 
size, productivity, innovativeness and their intra-industry distributions; (ii) performances – 
including individual profitabilities, growth profiles and survival probabilities, together, again, 
with their aggregate distributions – and (iii) their mapping into regimes of learning – e.g. 
modes of innovative search, etc. (cf. section 3.5).
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4.1  Microeconomic heterogeneity: size, to begin with 
 
We have repeatedly emphasized it already: firms persistently differ over all dimensions 
one is able to detect. 
A first, extremely robust, ‘stylized fact’ regards the quite wide variability in firm sizes.  
More precisely, one observes – throughout industrial history and across all countries – right-
skewed distributions of firm sizes: within a large literature see Steindl (1965), Hart and Prais 
(1956), Ijiri and Simon (1977), Hall (1987), Bottazzi et al. (2003), Lotti et al. (2003), Bottazzi 
and Secchi (2005), and Dosi (2007). 
Irrespectively of the precise form of the density function, the intuitive message is the 
coexistence of many relatively small firms with quite a few large and very large ones – indeed 
in a number much higher than the one would predict on the ground of any Gaussian shape.  In 
turn, all this militates against any naive notion of some ‘optimal size’ around which empirical 
distributions should be expected to fluctuate.  Notice that, as a consequence, also any theory 
of production centered around invariant U-shaped cost curves, familiar in microeconomic 
theory, looses a lot of plausibility: were they the rule, one ought to reasonably expect also a 
tendency to converge to such a technologically optimal equilibrium sizes. On the contrary, 
plausible candidates to the representation of the empirical size distributions are the log-
normal, Pareto and Yule ones.  Certainly, the full account of the distributions suffers from 
serious problems in offering also an exhaustive coverage for the smallest firms.  Recent 
attempts to do that, such as Axtell (2001) on the population of US firms, lend support to a 
power-law distribution linking firm size probability densities with the size ranking of firms 
themselves. 
All this primarily concerns aggregate manufacturing firm size distributions.  Are these 
properties robust to disaggregation?  An increasing body of finer sectoral data suggest that in 
fact they are not. Corroborating a conjecture put forward in Dosi et al (1995) and further 
explored in Marsili (2001), aggregate ‘well-behaved’ Pareto-type distributions may well be a 
puzzling outcome of sheer aggregation among diverse manufacturing sectors, characterized 
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by diverse regimes of technological learning and market interactions, which do not display 
Paretian distributions.  While some sectors present distributions rather similar to the 
aggregate ones, others are almost log-normal and yet others are bi-modal or even multi-
modal. More evidence is summarized in Dosi (2007). Together, admittedly circumstantial 
evidence hints at a plausible oligopolistic core vs. fringe firms separation in several sectors – 
indirectly supported by the mentioned bimodality of size distributions.
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Finally, note that even relatively stable industrial structures – as measured in terms of 
stability of size distributions – hide a much more turbulent microeconomics. Incumbents 
change their relative share and ranking
50 while a lot of ‘churning’ of new firms: roughly half 
disappear before they get to the age of five
51, but a subset of the survivors grows to significant 
share of most industries, and is also an important carrier of innovation and productivity 
growth.
52 
Come as it may, industrial structures – in this case proxied by size distributions – are 
the outcomes of the growth dynamics undergone by every entity in the industrial population 
(jointly, of course, with birth and death processes). What about such growth processes? 
 
4.2  Corporate growth rates and corporate profitabilities 
 
There are many studies that have explored empirically the extent to which Gibrat’s law, 
which proposes that firm growth rates are multiplicative and statistically independent of size, 
is a good first approximation of actual industrial dynamics. The paper by Lotti, Santarelli and 
Vivarelli (2003) provides a rich review. The evidence suggests that: (i) most often, smaller 
firms that survive under the period under analysis on average grow faster than larger firms. 
However, most studies do not count firms in existence at the start of the period that disappear 
somewhere over the period, and many small firms are young firms that generally have high 
mortality rates.  Otherwise, (ii) no strikingly robust relationship appears between size and 
average rates of growth (cf. Mansfield, 1962; Hall, 1987; Kumar, 1985; Bottazzi et al., 2003; 
and Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006; among others). The relationship between size and growth is 
modulated by the age of firms themselves – with age, broadly speaking, exerting negative 
effects of growth rates, but positive effects on survival probabilities, at least after some post-
infancy threshold (cf. Evans, 1987)
53. 
Note that such pieces of evidence are easily consistent with evolutionary theories of 
industrial change.  Indeed an evolutionary interpretation would be rather at odds with a notion 
of convergence to some invariant ‘optimal’ size, with decreasing returns above it.  
Conversely, it is rather agnostic on the precise specification of non-decreasing returns.  In 
particular, it does not have any difficulty in accepting a world characterized by roughly 
constant returns to scale, jointly with drivers of firm growth uncorrelated on average with 
size itself. Conversely, precious clues on the basic characteristics of the processes of market 
competition and corporate growth are offered by the statistical properties of the ‘error term’.  
                                                           
49 Indeed, an important research task ahead concerns the transition probabilities between ‘core’ and ‘fringe’. 
50 Cf. Louça and Mendonça (2002) on long-term patterns in the upper tail of the size distributions over the 
whole industrial sector.  However, within-industry rankings seem to be rather inertial: cf. Cantner and Krüger 
(2004) on German evidence. See also the comments in Dosi, Gambardella, et al. (2008). 
51 For comparative evidence of the OECD countries, cf. Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2005). 
52 Converging pieces of evidence are in Audretsch (1997), Baldwin and Gu (2006) and Foster, Haltiwanger and 
Syverson (2008). 
53 Moreover, the statistical relationships between size and growth rates appears to be influenced by the stage of 
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Note in this respect that the absence of any structure in the growth processes would be very 
damaging indeed to evolutionary theories of industrial change.  In fact, if one were to find 
corroboration to any ‘strong Gibrat’ hypothesis according to which growth would be driven 
by a multiple, small ‘atomless’ uncorrelated shocks, this would come as bad news to 
evolutionary interpretations whose basic building blocks -to recall- comprise the twin notions 
of (i) persistent heterogeneity among agents, and (ii) systematic processes of competitive 
selection among them. What properties in fact do the statistics on firm growth display? 
One of the most important pieces of evidence able to throw some light on the 
underlying drivers of corporate growth regards the distribution of growth rates themselves. 
The evidence suggest an extremely robust stylized fact: growth rates display distributions 
which are at least exponential (Laplace) or even fatter in their tails.
54  This property holds 
across (i) levels of aggregation; (ii) countries; (iii) different measures of size (e.g. sales, 
employees, value added, assets), even if (iv) one observes some (moderate) variations across 
sectors with respect to the distribution parameters.  Such statistical properties are indeed good 
news for evolutionary interpretations.  The generalized presence of fat tails in the distribution 
implies much more structure in the growth dynamics than generally assumed.  More 
specifically, ubiquitous fat tails are a sign of some underlying correlating mechanism which 
one would rule out if growth events were normally distributed, small, and independent.  In 
Bottazzi et al. (2003) and Dosi (2007) one conjectures that such mechanisms are likely to be 
of two types.  First, the very process of competition induces correlation.  Market shares must 
obviously add up to one: someone’s gain is someone else’s loss.  Second, in an evolutionary 
world one should indeed expect ‘lumpy’ growth events (of both positive and negative sign) 
such as the introduction of new products, the construction/closure of plants, entry to and exit 
from particular markets. 
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Together with corporate growth, profitability is another crucial measure of revealed 
corporate performances. Concerning the variable, there is indeed a robust literature on the 
persistent profitability differences across firms: see, among others, Müller (1986) and (1990), 
Cubbin and Geroski (1987), Geroski and Jacquemin (1988), Geroski (1988); Goddard and 
Wilson (1999), Cefis (2003a), Gschwandter (2004), Dosi (2007). Moreover, the 
autocorrelation over time in profit margins is extremely high in all manufacturing sectors, 
with just a relatively mild tendency  to mean-reversion , while, interestingly, the rates of 
change in profit margins display distributions which are again fat-tailed (at least exponential, 
or even fatter-tailed).  That is, we find again here the mark of powerful underlying correlation 
mechanisms which tend to induce ‘coarse grained’ shocks upon profitabilities. 
Indeed the bottom line is that core indicators of corporate performances such as growth 
and profitability confirm the already familiar widespread multifaceted heterogeneity across 
firms notwithstanding the competition process.  Given all that, a natural question concerns the 
roots of such heterogeneity itself. 
 
4.3  Behind heterogeneous performances: innovation and production efficiency 
 
                                                           
54 see Stanley et al., 1996; and Bottazzi and Secchi , 2003; on US data; Bottazzi et al., 2001; on the international 
pharmaceutical industry; Bottazzi, Cefis and Dosi , 2002; and Bottazzi et al., 2003; on the Italian industry; and 
the discussion in Dosi, 2007 
55 A suggestive attempt to model increasing-return dynamics yielding the observed fat-tailed distribution is in 
Bottazzi and Secchi (2005)   45
Straightforward candidates for the explanation of the differences in corporate 
performances are in fact (i) differences in the ability to innovate and/or adopt innovation 
developed elsewhere regarding product characteristics and production processes; (ii) different 
production efficiencies; (iii) different organizational arrangements; (iv) different propensities 
to invest and grow conditional on the foregoing set of variables. Plausibly the former three 
ensembles of variables may be expected to be related with each other (the behavioural aspects 
are a distinct matter). For example, technological innovations typically involve also changes 
in the organization of production; different ways of searching for innovations imply distinct 
organizational arrangements regarding the relationships amongst different corporate tasks 
(e.g. R&D, production, sales, etc.).  And, intuitively, technological and organizational 
innovations ultimately shape the degrees of efficiency in which inputs happens to generate 
outputs.   
What is the evidence concerning the patterns of technological innovation, on the one 
hand, and production efficiencies on the other?  (We are forced to neglect here the role of 
organizational variables.  In fact, organizational capabilities are intimately linked with the 
very process of technological innovation and with production efficiencies: cf. the insightful 
evidence in Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000). 
We have discussed at length in section 3.5 the evidence on asymmetries in production 
efficiencies – no matter how measured, e.g. in terms of labour productivities or TFPs -: 
widespread and persistent asymmetries are the general rule. 
Together, the literature on the economics of innovation surveyed in section 3, primarily 
from the angle of knowledge dynamics indeed suggests widespread differences across firms 
in their ability to innovate: 
(i)  Innovative capabilities appear to be highly asymmetric, with a rather small number of 
firms in each sector responsible for a good deal of innovation output, even among 
highly developed countries. 
(ii)  Somewhat similar considerations apply to the adoption of innovations, in the form of 
new production inputs, machinery, etc.(see section 3.9 above on ‘diffusion’) revealing 
asymmetric capabilities of learning and ‘creative adaptation’. 
(iii)  Differential degrees of innovativeness are generally persistent over time and often 
reveal a small ‘core’ of systematic innovators (cf. Bottazzi et al., 2001; Cefis, 2003; 
Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001; Malerba and Orsenigo,1996a; among others). 
(iv)  Relatedly, while the arrivals of major innovations are rare events, they are not 
independently distributed across firms.  Rather, recent evidence suggests that they tend 
to arrive in firm-specific ‘packets’ of different sizes. 
56 
In fact, all the evidence on wide asymmetries in the abilities to innovate and imitate is 
consistent with the interpretation of the patterns of knowledge accumulation put forward in 
section 3. And so is the evidence on micro-correlation of innovative events, well in tune with 
an evolutionary notion of few, high-capability, persistent innovators. 
                                                           
56 On the statistical properties of the discrete innovations, in general, cf. Silverberg (2003) showing a secular 
drifting Poisson-type process.  However, at a much finer level of observation the firm-specific patterns of 
innovation are not likely to be Poisson-distributed.  Rather, as one shows in Bottazzi et al. (2001) in the case of 
the pharmaceutical industry, few firms ‘draw’ relatively large ‘packets’ of innovations well described by Bose-
Einstein (rather than Poisson) statistics.   46
On a much larger scale, the persistent asymmetries across countries, even within the 




4.4  Corporate capabilities, competition and industrial change 
 
Differences in innovative abilities and efficiencies (together with differences in 
organizational set-ups and behaviours) ought to make-up the distinct corporate ‘identities’ 
which in turn should somehow influence those corporate performances discussed above. 
But do they?  How? And how are these relations influenced by behavioural (largely 
speaking, ‘strategic’) considerations on the side of individual firms? 
Let us consider first the impact of different degrees of innovativeness and different 
efficiencies upon profitability, growth and survival probabilities. 
In several studies firms that are identified as innovators tend to be more profitable than 
other firms: see Geroski, Machin and van Reenen (1993), Cefis (2003a), Cefis and Ciccarelli 
(2005), Roberts (1999), Dosi (2007), among others. Production efficiency also  shows a 
systematic positive influence upon profitability (cf. Bottazzi et al., 2009; Dosi, 2007)
58. 
However, there are some serious questions about how both superior innovative performance 
and superior production efficiency are identified and measured. Even if the measurements are 
taken at face value, the impact of both measured innovativeness and production efficiency 
upon growth performances appear to be quite uncertain. Mainly North-American evidence, 
mostly at plant level, does suggest that increasing output shares in high-productivity plants 
and decreasing shares of output in low-productivity ones are very important drivers in the 
growth of sectoral productivities, even if the process of displacement of lower efficiency 
plants is rather slow (cf. the evidence discussed in Ahn, 2001; Baily et al., 1992; Baldwin, 
1995; Baldwin and Gu, 2006). Firm-level data are less straightforward.  For example, Italian 
and French data (cf. Dosi, 2007; and Bottazzi et al, 2009) show a weak or non-existent 
relationship between relative (labour) productivities and growth: more efficient firms do not  
grow more. Moreover even when some positive relation between efficiency and growth 
appears, this is almost exclusively due to the impact of few outliers (the very best and the 
very worst). 
Concerning the impact of innovation the evidence from some industry-specific data sets 
such as the international and U.S. pharmaceutical industries shows that more innovative firms 
do not grow more (Bottazzi et al., 2001).  Rather the industry constantly displays the 
coexistence of heterogeneous types of firms (e.g. innovators vs. imitators). 
In complementary efforts, a growing number of scholars has indeed began doing 
precisely what we could call evolutionary accounting (even if most do not call it that way; 
however for an early example of the genre, cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982).  The fundamental 
evolutionary idea is that distributions (including, of course, their means, which end-up in 
sectoral and macrostatistics!) change as a result of (i) learning by incumbent entities; (ii) 
differential growth (that is, a form of selection) of incumbent entities themselves; (iii) death 
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Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz (2009). 
58 An important caveat here is that there might be an intrinsic sample selection bias in the data in favor of 
successful innovations: firms that try to innovate and do badly are not adequately counted as innovative firms. 
Another caveat, is that generally ‘efficiency’ is measured, due to data availability, in terms of deflated value 
added or deflated sales, folding together price and volume levels and dynamics. A rare exception is  Foster et al. 
(2008) who are able to draw upon micro data separating the two at micro level.   47
(indeed, a different and more radical form of selection); and (iv) entry of new entities.  
Favoured by the growing availability of micro longitudinal panel data, an emerging line of 
research (see Baily et al., 1996;  Foster et al., 1998; Brown and Earle, 2008; Baldwin and Gu, 
2006; among others, and the discussion in Bartelsman and Doms, 2000) investigates the 
properties of decomposition of whatever mean sectoral performance variable, e.g. typically 
productivity of some kind, of the following form, or variations thereof: 
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where П = productivities (or, for that matter, some other performance variables), s = 
shares (in total output or VA or employment or total capital assets . . .), while i is an index 
over incumbents, e over entrants, and f over exiting entities. 
The first term stands for the contribution of firm-specific changes holding shares 
constant
59 (sometimes called the within component), the second one captures the effects of the 
changes in the shares themselves, holding initial firm productivity levels constant (also 
known as the between component) and the last two take up the effect of entry and exit 
respectively. 
Of course, there is a considerable variation in the evidence depending on countries, 
industries and methods of analysis. However, some patterns emerge. First, the within 
component generally is significantly larger than the between one: putting it another way 
improvement of productivity by existing firms dominates selection across firms as a mode of 
industry advancement – at least concerning productivity (both labour- and TPF).  This 
emerges both from the foregoing ‘evolutionary accounting’ exercises as well as from general 
estimates on the relationship between efficiency and subsequent growth, allowing for firm 
fixed effects.  And, it holds both in the short and the medium term. So, for example, in the 
analyses of Bottazzi et al. (2009) on Italy and France firm-specific factors generally account 
for almost an order of magnitude more than ‘selection’ of the variance in firm growth rates.  
Second, relative efficiencies do influence survival probabilities, and it may well turn out that 
selective mechanisms across the population of firms operate much more effectively in the 
medium-long term at this level rather than in terms of varying shares over the total industry 
output. 
We have focused so far upon the linkages between admittedly rough proxies for 
innovativeness and productivity, on the one hand, and growth and survival, on the other. 
What about the relationships between profitability and the latter two variables? The evidence 
we are familiar with strikingly shows little or no link between profitability and firm growth of 
incumbents (cf. Bottazzi et al., 2009, on Italian and French longitudinal data). However, other 
pieces of evidence suggest also systematic effects of profitability upon survival probabilities 
(cf. the discussion in Bartelsman and Doms, 2003; and Foster et al., 2008). 
The implications of all these empirical regularities are far-reaching. 
                                                           
59 Shares in terms of what is a delicate issue: in terms of output? Value added? Or, conversely, employment? 
Relocation of resources and output across firms involves both changes in inputs and market shares.   48
Certainly, the recurrent evidence at all levels of observation of inter-firm heterogeneity 
and its persistence over time is well in tune with an evolutionary notion of idiosyncratic 
learning, innovation (or lack of it) and adaptation. Heterogeneous firms compete with each 
other and, given (possibly firm-specific or location-specific) input and output prices, obtain 
different returns.  Putting it in a different language, they obtain different ‘quasi-rent’ or, 
conversely, losses above/below the notional ‘pure competition’ profit rates.  Many firms 
enter, a roughly equivalent number of firms exits. In all that , the evidence increasingly 
reveals a rich structure in the processes of learning, competition and growth. As mentioned, 
various mechanisms of correlation – together with the ‘sunkness’ and indivisibilities of many 
technological events and investment decisions – yield a rather structured process of change in 
most variable of interest – e.g. size, productivity, profitability – also revealed by the ‘fat-
tailedness’ of the respective growth rates. At the same time, market selection among firms – 
the other central mechanism at work, together with firm-specific learning, in evolutionary 
interpretations of economic change, does not seem to be particularly powerful,   at least on the 
yearly or multi-yearly time scale at which statistics are reported (while the available time 
series are not generally long enough to precisely assess what happens in the long run, say 
decades).  Conversely, diverse degrees of efficiencies and innovativeness seem to yield 
primarily relatively persistent profitability differentials.  That is, contemporary markets do not 
appear to be too effective selectors delivering rewards and punishments in terms of relative 
sizes or shares – no matter how measured - according to differential efficiencies. Moreover, 
the absence of any strong relationship between profitability and growth militates against the 
‘naively Schumpeterian’ (or for that matter ‘classic’) notion that profits feed growth (by 
plausibly feeding investments). Selection amongst different variants of a technology, different 
vintages of equipment, different lines of production does occur and is a major driver of 
industrial dynamics. However, it seems to occur to a good extent within firms, driven by the 
implementation of ‘better’ processes of production and the abandonment of older less 
productive ones. 
Finally, the same evidence appears to run against the conjecture, put forward in the ‘60s 
and ‘70s by the ‘managerial’ theories of the firm on a trade off between profitability and 
growth with ‘managerialized’ firms trying to maximize growth subject to a minimum profit 
constraint.
60 
In turn, the (still tentative) observation that market selection that winnows directly on 
firms may play less of a role than that assumed in many models of evolutionary inspiration 
(see below) demands further advances in the understanding of how markets work (or do not), 
and of the structure of demand (we discuss these issues in Nelson, 2008b).  Here note the 
following. First, one measures ‘efficiency’ – supposedly a driver of differential selection – 
very imperfectly: we have already mentioned, as emphasized by Foster et al. (2008), that one 
ought to disentangle the price component of ‘value added’ (and thus the ‘price effect’ upon 
competitiveness) from ‘physical efficiency’ to which productivity strictly speaking refers. 
This applies to homogeneous products and even more so when products differ in their 
characteristics and performances: as this is often the case in modern industries, one ought to 
explicitly account for the impact of the latter upon competitiveness and revealed selection 
processes. Second, but relatedly, the notion of sharp boundaries between industries and 
generalized competition within them is too heroic to hold. It is more fruitful in many 
                                                           
60 In fact the absence of such a trade off had been already noted by Barna (1962).  Note also that this proposition 
is orthogonal to the finding that current growth appears to be correlated with future long-term profitability (cf. 
Geroski, Machin, and Walters, 1997).   49
industries to think of different sub-market of different sizes as the locus of competition (cf. 
Sutton, 1998). The characteristics and size of such submarkets offer also different constraints 
and opportunities for corporate growth.  Ferrari and Fiat operate in different submarkets, face 
different growth opportunities and do not compete with each other. However, the example is 
interesting also in another respect: Fiat can ‘grow’, as it actually happened, by acquiring 
Ferrari. Third, a growing micro evidence highlights the intertwining between technological 
and organizational factors as determinants of Schumpeterian competition: Bresnahan, 
Greenstein and Henderson (2008) illustrate the point in the case of IBM and Microsoft facing 
the introduction of the PC and the browser, respectively. Both firms, the work shows, faced 
organizational diseconomies of scope precisely in the corporate activities where they were 
stronger.. Fourth, in any case, the links between efficiency and innovation, on the one hand, 
and corporate growth, on the other, are mediated by large degrees of behavioural freedom, in 
terms e.g. of propensities to invest, export, expand abroad; pricing strategies; patterns of 
diversification; etc. 
 
4.5  Industry specific dynamics and industry life cycles 
 
So far we have discussed some properties of industrial evolution which appear to hold 
broadly across all industrial sectors. Conversely, are there sectoral specificities in the patterns 
of industrial evolution?  And do they map into those different technological and production 
regimes discussed above? Moreover, different sectors happen to be at different stages of their 
life cycles. How does that influence the characteristics of the processes of industrial 
evolution? 
In fact, significant industry-specific differences emerge from the data. The observation 
that variables like capital intensity, advertising intensity, R&D intensity – along with 
structural measures like concentration and performance measures like profitability – differ 
widely across sectors, is at the very origin of the birth of industrial economics as a discipline.  
Longitudinal micro data add further evidence.  So for example Jensen and McGuckin (1997) 
find that industry-specific effects also significantly influence firms’ heterogeneity, even if 
most of the observed variance in plants and firms characteristics is within industries.
61  Thus, 
it should not come as too big a surprise that phenomena like entry, exit and survival, 
persistence in firms attributes and performances, innovative activities and firms’ growth also 
exhibit significant inter-industry variability.  Audretsch (1997) reports on the relationships 
between entry, exit and survival entrants on the one hand, and industry characteristics like the 
rate of innovation and capital intensity on the other.  This evidence suggests, in particular, 
that survival is easier in those industries in which small firms are important sources of 
innovation, and that new surviving firms tend to grow faster in innovative industries and as a 
function of the gap between minimum efficient scale of output and firm size.  At the same 
time, however, the likelihood of survival decreases as a function of that gap.  The same 
happens in terms of innovation rates.   
Can one move a step further and link at least some characteristics of evolutionary 
patterns with the underlying technological regimes?  It is a conjecture put forward in Winter 
(1984) and Dosi et al. (1995), explored in both circumstances via simulation models, which 
the empirical evidence begins to corroborate (Marsili, 2001; Marsili and Verspagen, 2002), 
                                                           
61 Other studies (for example, Mueller 1990 and Geroski and Jacquemin 1988) showed that the persistence of 
profit also appears to depend on industry-specific characteristics as well as on firm-specific ones.  In particular, 
industry specific features as the intensity of advertising and of R&D appear to be highly correlated with the 
persistence of higher than average profits.   50
even if probably more disaggregate classification of the regimes themselves are needed 
beyond the ‘Schumpeter Mark I’ vs., ‘Mark II’ distinction, while together market regimes 
variables have to be introduced (Marsili and Verspagen, 2002). 
Do different industrial regimes correspond also to different innovation strategies of 
business firms?  The issue is still largely underexplored; however Srholec and Verspagen 
(2008) suggest that within a sector, strategic heterogeneity dominates upon sectoral effects: 
indeed, a challenging puzzle crossing over economics and strategic management. 
Thus far our discussion has been concerned with differences that exist across industries 
at any time. Now we shift our attention to changes that occur over time within an industry. 
No matter the technological regime in which they are embedded, individual industries 
evolve since their emergence all the way to their maturity, and frequently decline. 
Klepper (1997) offers a broad fresco of many industry life cycle dynamics: 
‘Three stages of evolution are distinguished. In the initial exploratory or embryonic stage, market 
volume is low, uncertainty is high, the products design is primitive, and unspecialized machinery 
is used to manufacture the product. Many firms enter and competition based on product 
innovation is intense.  In the second, intermediate or growth stage, output growth is high, the 
design of the product begins to stabilize, product innovation declines, and the production process 
becomes more refined as specialized machinery is substituted for labour.  Entry slows and a 
shakeout of producers occurs.  Stage three, the mature stage, corresponds to a mature market. 
Output growth slows, entry declines further, market shares stabilize, innovation are less 
significant, and management, marketing and manufacturing techniques become more refined.  
Evidence on first mover advantages […] and the link between market shares and profitability […] 
suggests that the firms that ultimately capture the greater share of the market and earn the greatest 
returns on investment tend to be those that enter earliest’ (Klepper, 1997, p. 148) 
Moreover, the surviving and often dominant firms tend to be those characterized by 
distinct innovative capabilities (Klepper and Simons, 2005; Cantner, Krüger and von Rhein, 
2008) which often were there at the start of the firms themselves. 
 
Insert Figure 5 here 
 
 
There is now a large number of studies exploring the explanatory power of 
technology/product cycle theory in a wide range of industries. For many industries major 
parts of the story hold up pretty well.
62 Part (a), (b), and (c) of Figure 5 regarding cars, tires 
and TVs, are a good illustration.  However, there is a range of industries where economies of 
scale in production never become so great, or the advantages of learning by doing so 
significant, that only large firms can survive, and entry is blocked. Many ‘supplies 
dominated’ sectors (cf. Pavitt’s taxonomy above) such as textiles and clothing are good 
examples. In other cases, while the large economies of scale predicted by product life cycle 
(PLC) theory in fact have emerged, the nature of the demand for a product class is sufficiently 
varied so that a single dominant design cannot emerge and take a large share of the overall 
market. The market for pharmaceuticals which is divided by the nature of the illnesses is an 
obvious example.   As surveyed in detail by Klepper (1997), alternatives to the canonic PLC 
template include first, industries wherein the dominant trend is toward ‘Smithian’ 
specialization across components along the overall production chain.  Second, and relatedly, 
                                                           
62 In such industries, the transition between the initial to the ‘mature’ phase appears to be associated also with 
different degrees of instability of market shares (cf. Mazzucato, 2002, on the PC industry) and departures from 
Gibrat type properties of growth (which seems to  be higher in the post-shakeout phase: cf. Geroski and 
Mazzucato, 2002)   51
the requirements by end users may well be sufficiently diverse to define technologically 
diverse market niches.  When, together, knowledge maintains a significant tacit cumulative 
and niche-specific component, such submarkets are likely to be supplied by different firms 
throughout the history of the industry.  As we discuss in Dosi, Gambardella et al. (2008) this 
is the case of most producer good industries including machine tools and instruments and 
several ‘complex products systems’ (cf. Figure 5, part (d) for an illustration concerning lasers; 
the case of jet engines is discussed in Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 2000). Equally interesting 
deviations from (or complications of) the technology cycle theory are broad industries where, 
while something like a product cycle dynamic seems to hold in particular eras, from time to 
time significantly new technologies arise, which upset the old order, and start off a new 
product cycle. Striking cases include the dramatic changes in aircraft systems technology, and 
together the identity of the dominant firms, set in train when the turbojet engine became 
preferred to the older gasoline reciprocating engines; the change in the dominant players in 
electronic circuitry when transistors and later integrated circuits replaced vacuum tubes; the 
rise of biotechnology as a vehicle for drug discovery and design.  
In these and other cases when a radically new technology has replaced an older mature 
one, as we have noted, old dominant firms often have difficulty in making the adjustments. In 
such circumstances, technological change has been what Tushman and Anderson (1986) have 
called ‘competence destroying’. The industry may experience a renewal of energy and 
progress, but often under the drive of a new set of firms. 
 
4.6  Models of industrial dynamics 
 
How does one formally represent the processes of industrial evolution? Evolutionary 
models of industrial dynamics - and economic change more generally – rest on the 
representation of multiple ‘boundedly rational’ heterogeneous  agents interacting with each 
other (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1984; Iwai 1984a and 1984b; Dosi et al., 1994, 
1995, and 2006; Bottazzi et al., 2001; Winter et al., 2003; Silverberg and Lenhert, 1993; 
Silverberg and Verspagen, 1996, Malerba, Nelson, Orsenigo, and Winter, 1999, 2007, 2008). 
‘Bounded rationality’ also takes the form of limited understanding by the agents of the causal 
structure of the environment in which they are embedded, a much lower ability to think 
through future contingencies, while behavioural patterns are often described in terms of 
relatively invariant routines. On the other hand, in this approach agents are capable of 
learning and thus improve their performance over time by changing their technologies and 
organizational practices.
63 
The symmetric complement of the assumptions on what agents know, learn and do 
concerns how markets (and other interaction environments) operate.  Observed industrial 
dynamics are obviously the joint outcome of both. But it makes a lot of difference (except for 
some rather peculiar circumstances), in terms of the properties of the dynamics themselves, 
whether and to what extent individual entities can figure out, so to speak ‘in their heads’, ex 
ante, what is going to happen to them, at least in probability, because they also know (and 
possibly collectively share) a common ‘model’ of their environment and shape their decision 
accordingly. In that respect evolutionary models are far from that extreme view whereby 
everyone knows ex ante everything that is relevant to know—about, for example, 
                                                           
63 Broadly defined ‘bounded rationality’ applies – even more so – in models of organizational ecologies (for 
surveys and discussions see Carroll, 1997; and Carroll and Hannan, 2000) whereby firms carry with them their 
idiosyncratic features at birth.   52
technologies, distribution of ‘talents’ or other causes of heterogeneity across the population of 
agents, strategies, etc.—and those markets operate essentially as collective arrangements 
setting incentive-compatible schemes. In that,  since agents ‘work it out’ beforehand, not 
much happens through the markets themselves - the consistency of individual plans  being 
guaranteed by the (certainly ‘hyper-rational’) assumptions on micro-knowledge.
64 
Evolutionary interpretations are nearer the opposite view whereby agents hold quite different 
views on what is going to happen to them (or to the same effect, that they hold a rather wild 
distribution of beliefs largely uncorrelated with what economists call the ‘fundamentals’) and, 
together, operate a diverse array of both physical and ‘social’ technologies. This applies 
notwithstanding the fact that firms in any one industry share a similar body of technological 
knowledge, that is the same paradigm.
65 Under these circumstances, markets operate first of 
all as selection devices, determining, ex post, profitabilities, survival probabilities and rates of 
growth.
66  Short of any belief in full micro rationality and collective equilibrium, the 
challenge for evolutionary models is to understand how joint processes of micro-learning and 
collective selection yield the observed dynamic patterns.  And, indeed, this is a central task 
for evolutionary interpretations.
67  There, as already mentioned, the commitment to individual 
rationality is much lower and, symmetrically, the explanatory burden placed upon some 
combination of idiosyncratic innovative learning and market selection is correspondingly 
higher. An explicit market dynamics is assumed. Innovation is the main engine of dynamics 
and evolution. As biologists would say, the ‘evolutionary landscape’ upon which evolution 
occurs is not fixed, but is continuously deformed by the endogenous learning activities of 
agents. Relatedly, one ought to interpret the aggregate regularities that are observed in the 
data as emerging from disequilibrium interactions among heterogeneous agents on the basis 
of some well-specified dynamic process. 
We have reviewed above (section 3.8) a few evolutionary approaches to modelling the 
learning part of the dynamics, that is the formal representation of stochastic innovation and 
imitation by individual firms.  Conversely, the selection part of the process is basically 
captured by different instantiations of some replication dynamics – in some closer or looser 
analogy with the biological counterpart.
68  The bottom line is a relation between some 
corporate characters – that is, technological, organizational or behavioural traits – which the 
particular interactive environment ‘favours’, on the one hand, and the rate of variation of the 
frequencies the carriers of such characters in the relevant populations on the other (more in 
Silverberg, 1988; Silverberg and Verspagen, 2005b; Andersen, 2004; and Metcalfe, 1998 and 
2005b).  A basic formulation in discrete time is  
                                                           
64 Of course, this view implies also that empirical observations -such as those presented above- should in 
principle be interpreted as sequences of equilibrium outcomes, nested into collectively consistent, highly 
sophisticated, plans of intertemporally maximizing agents [and this is indeed the spirit by which Lucas (1978) or 
Hopenhein (1992), for example, try to account for the evidence on skewed distributions of firms’ sizes, positive 
rates of entry and exit, etc.]. 
65 And in fact it happens that the effective entry of technologies based on a new paradigm often requires also the 
entry of new firms (a formalization of this idea is in Malerba et al., 2007). 
66 Interpretations based on ‘pure selection’ and ‘pure ex ante rationality’ happen to be equivalent whenever the 
underlying equilibria coincide, and, together, each empirical observation might be understood to be a rather 
close approximation to the ‘limit’ (in a mathematical sense) of some adjustment process operating at a time scale 
of order of magnitude faster than that at which empirical observations themselves are collected. Frankly, we find 
this possibility rather awkward, at best, as a general interpretative framework. 
67 Including Nelson and Winter (1982), Winter (1984), Silverberg et al. (1988), Dosi et al (1995), Bottazzi et al. 
(2007), Winter et al. (2002), Silverberg and Verspagen (1996). 
68 The original biological formulation comes from Fisher (1930).   53
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where si(t) is the market share of firm i at t, Ei (t) is a sort of (blackboxed) measure of its 
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course, first, the Ei(·) may well change over time, and indeed the learning dynamics is 
precisely about such changes.  Moreover, second, Ei is most likely a vector capturing multiple 
corporate features influencing the revealed ‘competitiveness’ of each firm. Third, the f(·,·,·) 
function is most likely non-linear (hence a further reason for a ‘rugged selection landscape’).  
Fourth, needless to say, one may add varying degrees of stochastic noise to the selection 
process, apart from the inherent stochasticity of firm-specific processes of change.  In the 
basic linear case with fixed micro characteristics, it is possible to derive analytically also 
some important properties of the dynamics of industrial means as a function of the variances 
across the micro Ei(·) variables.
69 
Many evolutionary  models explicitly represent the selection process entailed by market 
interactions via variants of a replicator equation: cf. for example Silverberg et al. (1988), 
Verspagen (1993), Dosi et al. (1995) and (2006). In other models the ‘replication process’ is 
implicit into the rates of expansion/contraction of heterogeneous  firms as a result of their 
differential efficiencies.  Nelson and Winter (1982) is an exemplar of this modelling 
approach.  Different production efficiencies imply different firm-specific unit costs.  The 
latter (possibly modulated by some behavioural rules governing output) determine different 
unit profit margins for each firm.  If there is some monotonic relation between profit margins 
and investments in future production capacity, higher efficiency yields higher investment 
which entails higher relative shares into the (t+1) overall output. 
A replication process similar in spirit involves equipment-embodied technological 
advances and rates of adoption of particular vintages proportional to their profitabilities: see 
for example Soete and Turner  (1984) analyzing technological diffusion and Silverberg and 
Lenhert (1993) for a model addressing the microeconomics of long-term growth.  
For the most part the models considered above are highly abstract and general. The 
recent modelling of Malerba, Nelson, Orsenigo, and Winter (1999, 2007, 2008) is guided by 
another theoretical strategy: that of trying to explain particular patterns of evolution observed 
in certain industries.
70 
One has only begun to systematically link evolutionary models with the ‘stylized facts’ 
of industrial dynamics discussed earlier, and, together of macro dynamics and growth.  Here 
the big challenge regards the ability of the models of generating – and in that sense 
‘explaining’ – rich ensembles of observed empirical regularities, both those that are generic, 
holding across sectors, countries and phases of the industry life cycles, and those that are 
                                                           
69 More in Metcalfe (2005b). Incidentally note that the whole field of evolutionary games, which we cannot 
discuss at any detail here, fundamentally studies the process of (deterministic or, more often, stochastic) 
adaptation/selection across a population of given traits/trait-carrying agents by analyzing the asymptotic 
properties (a little more discussion congenial to our argument here is in Dosi and Winter, 2003). 
70 The authors call their style of modelling ‘history friendly’. As the name suggests, is meant to be much nearer 
to the phenomenology of particular industry dynamics, their technological and market characteristics and the 
actual chronology of events (e.g. the introduction of the PC in the history of computers or that of integrated 
circuits in the history of semiconductors) and symmetrically try to account for relatively detailed features of the 
actual evolution of particular industries.   54
regime-specific. Indeed, what the analytical perspective has achieved so far is highly 
encouraging: it has contributed, in our view, important insights on the nature and drivers of 
industrial dynamics, highlighting also the ways different patters of learning and market 
selection influence variables such as the degrees of industrial concentration, turbulence in 
market shares, the dynamics of asymmetries across firm in production efficiency, firm 
mortality.
71 One major field of exploration has been indeed the mapping between regimes of 
learning and the ensuing industrial dynamics - from Nelson and Winter (1982) on the 
‘Schumpeterian tradeoffs’; to Winter (1984) on the properties of different innovative regimes, 
to Dosi et al. (1995), Marsili (2001), Winter et al. (2000) and (2003), Bottazzi, Dosi, 
Rocchetti (2001) addressing the statistical properties of industrial evolution and a detailed 
mapping between regimes of learning and selection into the statistical properties of industrial 
dynamics. More precisely, Dosi et al. (1995) and Marsili (2001) study the ways differences in 
the processes by which innovative opportunities are tapped (e.g. by entrants vs. incumbents, 
with or without cumulative learning) affect the evolution of industry structures, the degrees of 
turbulence of the latter, and the statistical properties of corporate growth. Conversely, 
Bottazzi, Dosi and Rocchetti (2001) and Winter et al. (2000) and (2003) focus on the 
properties of the ‘churning’ process characterising industrial evolution, and on the ensuing 
dynamics in costs and prices. 
Another major area of analysis has focused upon more aggregate statistical phenomena. 
After all, one of the major questions addressed in Nelson and Winter (1982)  and earlier 
Nelson (1968) was indeed whether the model was able to generate as an emergent property 
(at the time this was not the language but in fact the meaning) macro time series analogous to 
those analysed by Robert Solow in his pioneering growth accounting and modelling efforts. 
And the answer was gloriously positive. A good deal of work has gone on in the area. In fact 
all evolutionary models naturally generate innovation-driven endogenous growth resting on 
underlying industrial dynamics of the type discussed above. Some models of evolutionary 
growth have studied the features of the microdynamics and the interaction patterns underlying 
the long-term properties of growth (cf. Silverberg and Lenhert, 1984; and Chiaromonte and 
Dosi, 1993). Other has focused upon the convergence/divergence dynamics among trading 
economies (cf. Dosi et al., 1994; Verspagen, 1993, among others). More recently, one has 
begun to explore the properties of growth dynamics jointly with an ensemble of ‘cyclical’ 
macro properties (e.g. fluctuations in macro demand, employment rates, investment, etc.) 
grounded upon the same evolutionary industrial foundations (cf. Dosi, Fagiolo and Roventini, 
2006 and 2008; Dawid, 2006, offers a broad picture on the general family of agent-based 
models). 
As we see it, there is a very promising and very challenging future ahead for 
evolutionary / agent-based formalizations. The ambition, not out of reach, is to offer a 
relatively verified interpretation of a large ensemble of phenomena at different level of 
aggregation – ranging from ‘industrial stylized facts’ to phenomena concerning the properties 
of growth and fluctuations (and crisis!). In this respect if we were to name just out major 
challenge to formal evolutionary modelling, we would name the following. 
More work certainly is needed on selection processes and dynamics.  A major step 
forward in this respect would involve a detailed analysis of how markets work.  Surprisingly 
enough, we still have very few empirical work of the kind pioneered by Alan Kirman and 
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colleagues (Kirman, 2001; and Weisbuch, Kirman, Herreiner, 2000), studying the institutional 
architectures, the actual mechanisms of exchange, and the ensuing dynamics of prices and 
quantities.  And, symmetrically, we have still very few models – most likely of the ‘agent-
based’ kind (cf. again the critical review in Dawid, 2006) – exploring the same phenomena 
from the side of the theory.  Needless to say, the analysis of how markets work is crucial to 
understand what are the main dimensions of the ‘selection’ landscape and how market 
selection operates. 
As we have noted, to date most formal evolutionary modelling has presumed that a 
large share of ‘selection’ occurs through the selection on firms – and through that on the 
technologies and practices of which firms are carriers (i.e. the equivalent of their 
‘genotypes’), while the empirical evidence suggests that this is not the main part of the 
selection story. At least over the short and medium run a good deal of selection of techniques 
and practices goes on within firms. Moreover, the generality of evolutionary models so far has 
assumed some monotonicity in the relations between  ‘fundamental’ determinants of 
competitiveness / revealed ‘fitness’, and subsequent relative growth.
72 However, as we have 
seen above, the evidence on these selective processes suggests that selection forces, on 
practices as well as on firms, are weaker than those theorised. In turn, these persistent 
asymmetries may well be the consequence of various forms of market ‘imperfections’ – 
including informational ones – which, together with endemic ‘satisficing’ behaviours, allow 
firms characterized by diverse degrees of efficiency and product qualities to co-exist without 
too much relative pressure. On the modelling side such evidence entails two complementary 
challenges. First, one ought to pay more attention to the workings of diffusion processes into 
the evolutionary dynamics (one of the few incumbent examples is Silverberg et al., 1988).  
Second, the models ought to be able to account for evolution occurring over ‘fitness 
landscapes’ which for a good portion are roughly flat. 
 
 
5  Innovation, industrial evolution and economic growth. Some conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have led the reader from the investigation of the nature and dynamics 
of technological knowledge all the way through analysis of how technological (and 
organizational) innovation and imitation drive the evolution of industries.  The understanding 
of the structure of technological knowledge and its diversity across different technological 
paradigms, together with the understanding of the ways such knowledge is generated, 
augmented and diffused – we have argued – are fundamental also for the understanding of the 
rates and directions of innovative activities, well beyond the incentive economic agents face. 
Different abilities to innovate and imitate are central aspects and drivers of industrial 
evolution, shaping the patterns of growth, decline and exit over populations of competing 
firms as well as the opportunities of entry of new firms.  In the chapter we have discussed 
such dynamics as evolutionary processes driven by the twin forces of (often mistake-ridden) 
idiosyncratic learning by persistently heterogeneous  firms, on the one hand, and (imperfect) 
market selection delivering prizes and penalties – in terms of profits, possibilities of growth 
and survival probabilities - across such heterogeneous  corporate populations, on the other. In 
that, we argued, firm-specific learning processes appear to be relatively more powerful than 
between-firms selection dynamics. 
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The learning going on in an economy has a collective as well as an individual element. 
While their capabilities and actions remain far from identical, firms in the same industry often 
learn similar things about the value of  and how to operate the technological developments 
that are emerging. And firms learn from each other, sometimes as a result of deliberate 
communication, sometimes because at least a portion of what is going on in individual firms 
becomes public knowledge. As we stressed, the broad elements of technological paradigms 
are common property for technical people in a field. As a consequence, even while selection 
on firms often is relatively weak, there generally is significant selection on new technological 
variants that are being introduced to a field, with advances that tend to get into broad practice, 
although, as the diffusion studies we described earlier attest,  the process of selection may 
take considerable time.  
We have here the basic ingredients of an evolutionary interpretation of economic 
growth and development.  An evolutionary account would highlight the significant 
differences in the rates of progress at any time across different technologies and industries, 
which we alluded to in our earlier discussion. There is a developing body of research and 
writing that aims to explain such differences (see e.g. Nelson 2003, and 2008). As mentioned 
earlier, an important underlying variable seems to be the strength of the scientific fields that 
illuminate the technologies used in an area of practice. However, there clearly are a number of 
factors at work. And as we have noted, while there are exceptions, progress within a field of 
technology tends to become more narrowly focused and to slow down as the technology 
matures.  
  While repressed in neoclassical growth theory, the process of economic growth as we 
have experienced it has been driven by the continuing introduction of new products and new 
technologies, and the continuing shifting of resources from older industries where the rate of 
advance had slowed down to emerging new industries. The continuing growth of output per 
worker and per capita incomes that the industrial economies have experienced would not have 
been possible without this kind of an evolutionary process.
73  
A full evolutionary account of economic growth also would take into account that the 
historical time path of growth tends to be punctuated by ‘eras’ characterized by the 
development and diffusion of specific constellations of ‘general purpose’ technologies 
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(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995), that is broad techno-economic paradigms in the sense of 
Perez (1985), Freeman and Perez (1988), and Freeman and Louça (2001).   During a 
particular economic era, much of the economic growth is accounted for by innovation and 
productivity growth in the industries that produce the goods that directly incorporate the 
driving technological paradigms and also in the downstream industries that are able to use 
these goods as inputs (historically, this was the case of steam power, later electricity and the 
internal combustion engine, and today it is the case of ICT technologies).
74  
Evolutionary processes of economic growth are embedded in a rich structure of 
institutions.  There is now an extensive empirical literature concerned with the institutions of 
what has been called innovation systems (see  Part II in Freeman and Louça, 2001; Lundvall, 
1992,; Nelson, 1993). That literature has been concerned with matters like cooperative 
arrangements among firms, the role of universities in technological progress and modes of 
university-industry interaction in different industries, the variety of Government programs 
supporting technological advance, and related matters.  Others relevant institutions pertain to 
the ‘political economy’ of socio-economic arrangements governing how firms are organized 
and managed,  labour markets, finance/industry relations, corporate laws, etc. In fact, a 
general conjecture here is that economic growth is driven by  the co-evolution of technologies 
and institutions (Nelson, 2008c; Freeman, 2008).  See also Hodgson (1999) on the 
institutional embeddedness of evolutionary processes. 
Detailed analysis of macroeconomic growth as an innovation-driven evolutionary 
process, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter.  Consider the foregoing discussion as a 
sketch of its building blocks. 
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Fig. 1. The progress of computing measured in cost per computation per second deflated by  
the price index  for GDP in 2006 prices. Source: Nordhaus (2007).   59
 
Fig. 2. Moore’s Law and Technology Scaling. Source: Zheng (2008) 
 
 
Fig.3. Microheterogeneity and technological trajectories   60
 
 
Fig. 4. The diffusion of continuous casting of steel, as a percentage 
of total crude steel production.   Source: Ray (1989, p. 4) 
   61
 
Figure 5: Entry, Exit, and Number (a) of Automobile Producers, 1985-1996; (b) of Tire Producers, 1901-
80, (c) Television Producers, 1946-89; (d) of Laser Producers, 1961-94. Source: Arora et al. (2006) BIBLIOGRAPHY 
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